University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School

Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law
10-25-2010

Privacy Torts: Unreliable Remedies for LGBT Plaintiffs
Anita L. Allen
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Gender and Sexuality Commons, Law and Society
Commons, Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Studies Commons, Privacy Law Commons, Public
Law and Legal Theory Commons, Public Policy Commons, Sexuality and the Law Commons, and the
Torts Commons

Repository Citation
Allen, Anita L., "Privacy Torts: Unreliable Remedies for LGBT Plaintiffs" (2010). Faculty Scholarship at
Penn Law. 335.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/335

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu.

allenCLRfinalNoPagination.doc (Do Not Delete)

12/1/2010 4:33 PM

Privacy Torts: Unreliable Remedies for
LGBT Plaintiffs
Anita L. Allen†
INTRODUCTION
In the United States, both constitutional law and tort law recognize the
right to privacy, understood as legal entitlement to an intimate life of one’s own
free from undue interference by others and the state.1 Lesbian, gay, bisexual,
and transgender (“LGBT”) persons have defended their interests in dignity,
equality, autonomy, and intimate relationships in the courts by appealing to that
right.
In the constitutional arena, LGBT Americans have claimed the protection
of state and federal privacy rights with a modicum of well-known success.2
Copyright © 2010 California Law Review, Inc. California Law Review, Inc. (CLR) is a
California nonprofit corporation. CLR and the authors are solely responsible for the content of
their publications
† Anita L. Allen, J.D., Ph.D., Henry R. Silverman, Professor of Law and Professor of
Philosophy, University of Pennsylvania. I would like to thank Mr. Erez Aloni, LLM., for
invaluable research assistance.
1. The right to privacy is also recognized by federal statutes. See, e.g., Privacy Act of 1974,
5 U.S.C. § 552a (2006). See generally Anita L. Allen, Privacy Law and Society
(2007) (textbook of common law, constitutional, and statutory privacy and data protection law,
including chapters that focus on federal internet, communications and surveillance statutes).
Federal statutes whose bare titles do not suggest privacy protection nonetheless function to create
medical, financial, and other privacy rights federal agencies are empowered to enforce. Implicated
in a recent controversy concerning LGBT youth, the Federal Trade Commission Act is an apt
example. In a July 1, 2010 letter, David Vladek, Director of the Federal Trade Commission’s
Bureau of Consumer Protection, warned that plans pursuant to a bankruptcy proceeding to sell
personal information of defunct XY Magazine subscribers and XY.com site users (as an asset
belonging to magazine and site founder Peter Ian Cummings) could violate the Federal Trade
Commission Act’s prohibition against “unfair or deceptive acts or practices.” See Letter from
David C. Vladek, Dir. of the Bureau of Consumer Prot., U.S. Fed. Trade Comm’n, to Peter Larson
& Martin E. Shmagin (July 1, 2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/closings/100712xy.pdf.
XY.com had expressly promised privacy and anonymity to its site users, most of whom were
teenagers interested in gay lifestyles and issues. Id. Mr. Vladek requested that “to avoid the
possibility that this highly sensitive data” revealing the sexual orientation of young men and teens
“fall into the wrong hands,” the data “ be destroyed (along with any credit card data still being
retained) as soon as possible.” Id.
2. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (striking down laws criminalizing
consensual sexual acts between same-sex adults); see also Goodridge v. Dep’t. of Pub. Health,
798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (recognizing right to same-sex marriage in Commonwealth of
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Holding that homosexuals have the same right to sexual privacy as
heterosexuals, Lawrence v. Texas symbolizes the possibility of victory in the
courts for LGBT Americans seeking privacy in intimate life. “Liberty,” wrote
Justice Anthony Kennedy in Lawrence, “presumes an autonomy of self that
includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct.”3
In another important decision, Goodridge v. Massachusetts Department of
Public Health, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that state
prohibitions on same-sex marriage lacked a rational basis and violated the state
constitution’s affirmation of “the dignity and equality of all individuals,” with a
concurring justice explaining that the “right to marry is not a privilege
conferred by the State, but a fundamental right that is protected against
unwarranted State interference.”4
In the U.S. tort arena, as in the state and federal constitutional arenas,
LGBT plaintiffs have claimed violations of their privacy rights and have
sometimes won.5 In common law privacy tort cases, the defendants charged
with privacy violations typically have included private-sector employers,6 the
professional media,7 retailers,8 or private individuals.9 As detailed throughout
this Article, LGBT plaintiffs have accused such defendants of prying, spying,
insulting or harassing them, or disclosing their birth sex, sexual orientation, or
medical information without authorization. Lawsuits have framed the violations
experienced by LGBT claimants as one or more of the four privacy torts Dean
William L. Prosser distinguished10 and subsequently enshrined in the American
Law Institute’s Second Restatement of Torts.11 Several authors have argued
Massachusetts).
3. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562.
4. Goodridge, 798 N.E. 2d at 948.
5. See, e.g., Simpson v. Burrows, 90 F. Supp. 2d 1108 (D. Or. 2000) (lesbian
businesswoman alleging locals invaded her common law privacy rights, inflicted emotional
distress, and defamed her in concerted campaign to oust her and her partner from Christmas
Valley community).
6. See, e.g., Greenwood v. Taft, Stettinius & Hollister, 663 N.E.2d 1030, 1034 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1995) (whether law firm invaded a gay employee’s privacy by disclosing his sexual
orientation within the firm after he named his male partner as his pension beneficiary was a
question of fact for a trial court).
7. See, e.g., Prince v. Out Publ’g, No. B140475, 2002 WL 7999 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 3,
2002) (gay lifestyle magazine not liable for invasion of privacy for having acquired and published
photographs of partly closeted gay model without his consent).
8. See, e.g., Elmore v. Atl. Zayre, Inc., 341 S.E.2d 905, 905 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986) (plaintiff
not entitled to recover for privacy invasion where retail store employees called police after
peeping through a ceiling crack to view him in a toilet stall where he was allegedly engaging in
“sodomy”).
9. See, e.g., Plaxico v. Michael, 735 So. 2d 1036, 1038 (Miss. 1999) (lesbian plaintiff not
entitled to recover for privacy invasion after lover’s ex-husband spied on her, photographed her
partially nude in her bedroom, and then distributed photographs to gain advantage in a child
custody dispute).
10. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 Calif. L. Rev. 383, 423 (1960).
11. The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides that the right of privacy is invaded by “(a)
unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another . . . or (b)appropriation of the other’s name
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that the invasion of privacy torts, especially Prosser’s “unreasonable publicity
given to the other’s private life,” are potentially useful remedies for LGBT
plaintiffs.12 But LGBT plaintiffs relying on Prosser’s common law tort
remedies have not been as successful as some would have predicted based on a
general understanding of the torts and their superficial appeal. The common
law of torts has yet to generate its Goodridge or Lawrence.
In this Article I analyze about three dozen cases, mostly published
appellate cases, in which LGBT plaintiffs have alleged one or more of
Prosser’s four common law privacy tort offenses on facts that expressly involve
their sexual orientations or gender identities.13 The aims of my analysis are
twofold.
First, I wish to contribute to the understanding of the legacy of Prosser’s
four-fold taxonomy of privacy tort claims—intrusion, appropriation,
publication of private fact, and false light publication. As noted, the taxonomy
appeared in Prosser’s 1960 article.14 Serving as its lead reporter, Prosser later
incorporated his taxonomy into the Restatement (Second) of Torts.15 I argue
or likeness . . . ; or (c) unreasonable publicity given to the other’s private life . . . ; or (d) publicity
that unreasonably places the other in a false light before the public . . . .” Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 652A(2) (1977).
12. See, e.g., Barbara Moretti, Outing: Justifiable or Unwarranted Invasion of Privacy?
The Private Facts Tort as a Remedy for Disclosures of Sexual Orientation, 11 Cardozo Arts
& Ent. L.J. 857, 896–98 (1993) (the private facts tort should be available as remedy for
persons whose sexual orientation is exposed without consent by others seeking to combat AIDS,
identify secret homosexuals, or provide homosexual role models); Eric K.M. Yatar, Defamation,
Privacy, and the Changing Social Status of Homosexuality: Re-Thinking Supreme Court Gay
Rights Jurisprudence, 12 Tul J.L. & Sexuality 119, 127 (2003) (the private facts tort
offers a potential “route to recovery for the individual who is accused of or revealed as being a
homosexual”); cf. Keith J. Hilzendeger, Comment, Unreasonable Publicity: How Well Does Tort
Law Protect the Unwarranted Disclosure of a Person’s HIV-Positive Status?, 35 Ariz. St.
L.J. 187, 188 (2003) (courts should offer broader protection to plaintiffs suing under privacy
facts torts than the Restatement of Torts currently calls for); Ronald F. Wick, Out of the Closet and
Into the Headlines: “Outing” and the Private Facts Tort, 80 Geo. L.J. 413, 427 (1991)
(same).
13. For this Article, I attempted to gather all of the reported privacy tort cases to date in
which plaintiffs self-identified as lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transsexual or transgender. (In the
attempt I uncovered a number of pending and unpublished LGBT-plaintiff privacy tort cases,
along with cases in which persons have sued under privacy tort theories for misattribution of
gender-nonconforming traits, see Cason v. Baskin, 20 So. 2d 243 (Fla. 1944), homosexuality or
being transgender. I have incorporated all of these interesting cases into the Article.) Extrapolating
from my findings and the empirical results reported by William McLauchlan, see William
McLauchlan, Why People Litigate: An Examination of Privacy Tort Cases (Apr. 3, 2008) (paper
presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Sci. Ass’n Annual Nat’l Conference,
Palmer House Hotel, Hilton, Chicago, IL), available at http://www.allacademic.com/
meta/p266091_index.html, I estimate that reported appellate cases brought by LGBT persons
alleging LGBT-related offenses probably account for no more than 3 percent of the total number
of appellate privacy cases decided since 1906. Mclaughlan offers 350 as the total number of
appellate privacy tort cases decided in forty-seven states between 1906 and the year 2000. Id. at
27.
14. Prosser, supra note 10.
15. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652A(2) (1977).
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that although most courts adopting the Restatement have not questioned the
accuracy of Prosser’s distinctive formal taxonomy,16 plaintiffs’ lawyers in
LGBT issues-related cases implicitly challenge the taxonomy by alleging that a
single encounter with defendants resulted in violations encompassing two,
three, or all four of Prosser’s invasion of privacy torts. I conclude that the
frequent practice of characterizing a single privacy invasion as an instance of
multiple privacy torts calls into question the integrity of Prosser’s framework of
formal categories. Although I do not claim that LGBT issues-related cases
strain Prosser’s taxonomy any more than other privacy tort cases, I do believe
this body of cases exposes the limitations of Prosser’s distinctions on
particularly poignant and compelling facts.
Second, I wish to assess the efficacy of existing privacy tort remedies for
persons alleging wrongs tied to sexual orientation and gender identity. In this
regard, I maintain that the theoretically promising invasion of privacy torts
have too often been practical disappointments for LGBT plaintiffs in the
courts.17 To provide real, consistent remedies for LGBT plaintiffs, courts must
refashion their understandings of how critical elements of privacy torts can be
met and withstand defenses.
The post-1960 cases tentatively support three main conclusions about the
efficacy of privacy tort remedies. First, in the past half century, the invasion of
privacy tort has not been especially useful to LGBT plaintiffs seeking monetary
and injunctive relief in cases related to their sexual orientations or identities.
Second, as applied, the invasion of privacy tort has not reliably vindicated the
complex interest LGBT plaintiffs understandably assert in what I term
“selective disclosure” of their sexual orientations or identities. Third, recent
success in the LGBT population’s historic quest for equality and inclusion
potentially undercuts the already tenuous practical utility of the invasion of
privacy tort. Courts may fail to discern that sexual orientation and sexual
identity-related privacy protection is warranted for LGBT individuals if, on the
societal level, there has been a significant reduction in violence, social stigma,
and discrimination associated with open LGBT status. Wins in Lawrence and
Goodridge signal such a reduction, as does pending legislation to abolish the

16. Even the courts that have rejected the false light tort or the private fact tort have not
done so on the ground that the taxonomy itself is flawed. See generally James B. Lake,
Restraining False Light: Constitutional and Common Law Limits on a “Troublesome Tort”, 61
Fed. Comm. L.J. 625, 639–48 (2009) (stating courts reject false light tort because they
believe it overlaps the defamation tort and the publication of private fact tort because they believe
it impairs freedom of speech).
17. Cf. Hilary E. Ware, Note, Celebrity Privacy Rights and Free Speech: Recalibrating
Tort Remedies for “Outed” Celebrities, 32 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 449, 468, 488
(1997) (arguing that privacy torts are “unpromising” remedies against unwanted disclosure of
homosexuality and need to be “reconceptualiz[ed]”). My broader contention is that the torts are
unpromising remedies against not only unwanted disclosure, but also against unwanted intrusion,
false light publicity, and appropriation.
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nation’s policy against homosexuals in the military.18
Part I briefly recites the history and background of the invasion of privacy
tort, an indispensable highlight of which is the seminal 1890 Harvard Law
Review article by Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis. I then organize my
substantive analysis to mirror the structure of Prosser’s classic 1960 article.
Prosser’s article devoted separate sections to each of the four torts comprising
his descriptive taxonomy of privacy claims. Part II examines LGBT plaintiffs’
“intrusion” claims. I group plaintiffs’ intrusion claims into subcategories
Prosser did not identify, and suggest why even seemingly strong intrusion
claims brought by LGBT parties have failed. Part III examines LGBT
plaintiffs’ “public disclosure of private facts” claims. I explain why courts are
unreceptive to the notion that a person should be legally entitled to disclose
selectively—that is, disclose in some contexts to some persons but not others—
sexual orientation, same-sex relationships, and birth sex. Part IV assesses false
light publication claims by LGBT plaintiffs and persons inaccurately depicted
as such. Plaintiffs alleging they are not LGBT, but that they have been publicly
described as such, appear to have an easier time with the false light tort than
plaintiffs who are LGBT alleging that their lives and identities have been
wrongfully distorted due to prejudice and intolerance. Part V examines LGBT
plaintiffs’ commercial appropriation claims, and the doctrinal reasons they
generally fail, unrelated to sexual orientation, gender, or birth sex. Tort
doctrines afford remarkable freedom to those who make unauthorized use of
photographs in “newsworthy” and other publications. The case law illustrates
that implications of this doctrinal latitude are especially serious for LGBT
people.
After defending his descriptive taxonomy, Prosser devoted the final
sections of his article to “common features,”19 “public figures and public
interest,”20 “limitations,”21 and “defenses.”22 These sections reflected
skepticism about the privacy tort and revealed concerns that unbridled
expansion of the privacy torts could interfere with First Amendment freedoms
of speech and press and crowd the proper domains of the defamation and
infliction of emotional distress torts. Responding with hindsight to some of
these jurisprudential concerns, Part VI notes judicial observations about the

18. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, H.R.5136, 111th Cong.
(2010) (received and read twice in Senate, June 28, 2010); see also Log Cabin Republicans v.
United States, No. CV 04-08425-VAP EX, 2010 WL 3960791 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 2010) (holding
DADT unconstitutional and issuing an injunction to stop the enforcement of the policy); accord,
Witt v. U.S. Dept. of Air Force, No. 06-5195RBL, 2010 WL 3732189 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 24,
2010) (holding that the application of DADT violated the plaintiff’s due process rights, and
ordering to restore her military service).
19. Prosser, supra note 10, at 407.
20. Id. at 410.
21. Id. at 415.
22. Id. at 419.
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interplay and possible redundancy of privacy invasion and defamation
remedies. Rounding out my account of the experience of LGBT privacy
plaintiffs, I conclude with an assessment of the fate of intentional infliction of
emotional distress claims brought alongside LGBT plaintiffs’ privacy claims.
I
HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF THE PRIVACY TORT
The privacy tort is a modern cause of action that has been recognized in
most states.23 The concept of a common law right to privacy took flight in
1890. The prominent lawyer and affluent businessman Samuel D. Warren was
unhappy about attention the press paid to his lavish social life.24 Warren
pressured his reluctant friend and law partner Louis D. Brandeis into
coauthoring a law review article urging recognition of an invasion of privacy
tort.25 The tort would deter and redress publication in newspapers of gossip and
photographs that “invaded the sacred precincts of private and domestic life”
and thereby injured “inviolate personality.”26 A rhetorical tour de force, the
article inspired the judiciary. Courts soon began citing the article with approval,
eventually expanding the understanding of the kinds of litigable privacy wrongs
to include violations of modesty and genteel refinement.27 In 1906, relying on
23. The first use of the word “privacy” in a state court case may have been in State v.
Mann, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) 263 (1829), where the court declined to consider punishment for battery
against a slave “by reasons of its privacy”—a privacy which permits the master to exact “bloody
vengeance” in response to unruly disloyalty. Id. at 267; see also Frederick S. Lane,
American Privacy: The 400-Year History of Our Most Contested
Right 59 (2009). The term cropped up again in 1830 and 1868 in the voices of judges
describing the proper realm of women (privacy life) and the rationale for the authority of husbands
to physically discipline their spouses (domestic privacy). Id. at 60. The state of Washington in
1889 became the first to “explicitly codify a right to privacy in its state constitution: ‘No person
shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law.’” Id.
(citation omitted).
24. See generally Melvin I. Urofsky, Louis D. Brandeis: A Life 46–
104 (2009). In his influential article on privacy, Dean Prosser stated that the invasion of privacy
tort was “a most marvelous tree to grow from the wedding of the daughter of Mr. Samuel D.
Warren.” Prosser, supra note 10, at 423. But it is doubtful that Warren had a daughter of
marriageable age in 1890, a mere seven years after his own marriage. Warren married his wife
Mabel Bayard in 1883, a wedding from which the bride banned the groom’s best friend, Louis D.
Brandeis, because he was Jewish. See Urofsky, supra note 24, at 97.
25. Urofsky, supra note 24, at 98 (“Naturally the penny press of the era wanted to report
on the doings of [Warren’s circle of family and friends] . . . men and women who seemed to party
constantly, had homes in the city and the country, rode to the hounds, sailed, and had money to
support such a lifestyle. For reasons not altogether clear, at some point Sam began to resent what
he saw as press intrusion into his private life, and turned to Louis. Brandeis did not really want to
get involved (he said he would have preferred to write on the duty of publicity than on the right to
privacy) but, at his friend’s importuning, agreed to look into the issue.”).
26. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev.
193, 195, 205 (1890).
27. See, e.g., Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 252 (1891) (holding that a
female plaintiff could not be forced to undergo a medical examination and thereby “lay bare the
body,” citing “[t]he inviolability of the person” and the right “to be let alone,” and thus echoing
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natural law to bypass the limitations of positive law that kept New York’s
Court of Appeals from recognizing a privacy right in a famous 1902 decision,28
the Supreme Court of Georgia became the first state high court to allow a
plaintiff to sue under the privacy tort theory.29 According to the unanimous
opinion by Justice Cobb, “The right of privacy has its foundation in the
instincts of nature.”30 The victim of a privacy invasion is “in reality a slave,
without hope of freedom, held to service by a merciless master.”31 Other courts
followed Georgia’s lead, and tort actions premised on invasion of privacy soon
proliferated.32
A. Prosser’s Influential Taxonomy
Prosser’s historic 1960 article assessing the proliferation of privacy tort
actions had a major impact on subsequent scholarly understanding of the early
history of the invasion of privacy tort. Moreover, Prosser’s descriptive
taxonomy of a half century of cases would govern the subsequent doctrinal
development of the invasion of privacy tort in the courts.
Prosser framed his article as an original analysis of about three hundred
published court opinions in privacy-related tort cases.33 Prosser’s thesis was
that the invasion of privacy tort, then recognized by what he called an

Warren and Brandeis); Schuyler v. Curtis, 15 N.Y.S. 787, 788 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1891) (family of
deceased women could block the erection of a bust in her honor, on the ground that she was not a
“public character” but “a woman of great refinement and cultivation” who preferred privacy and
had a right to it).
28. See Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442, 442 (N.Y. 1902) (holding
that the right to privacy tort had not yet been adopted and therefore could not provide a remedy for
a woman whose photograph had been used on packaging for baking flour without her consent).
29. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 80–81 (Ga. 1905) (“So thoroughly
satisfied are we that the law recognizes within proper limits, as a legal right, the right of privacy,
and that the publication of one’s picture without his consent by another as an advertisement, for
the mere purpose of increasing the profits and gains of the advertiser, is an invasion of this right,
that we venture to predict that the day will come that the American bar will marvel that a contrary
view was ever entertained by judges of eminence and ability . . . .”).
30. Id. at 69.
31. Id. at 80.
32. In his 1960 article, Prosser comprehensively cited and sorted the cases spawned by
Pavesich, notable examples of which are Sidis v. F-R Publishing, 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940)
(New York not liable for publishing unflattering story about former child prodigy); Melvin v.
Reid, 297 P. 91 (Cal. Ct. App. 1931) (privacy of ex-prostitute and acquitted murder defendant
invaded by unauthorized film about her life); and Cason v. Baskin, 20 So. 2d 243 (Fla. 1944)
(memoir writer liable to woman repelled by portrayal of her as a woman with masculine virtues).
See also McLauchlan, supra note 13. According to McLauchlan, about ten privacy tort cases
are decided each year on appeal in the United States (excluding, Alaska, Hawaii and Utah) and
there have been a total of about 350 such cases through the year 2000, most losses for their
plaintiffs. Id. at 25, 27 fig.1. He places the odds of winning a privacy appeal as no better than
three to one. Id. at 28 fig.2. He speculates that people litigate privacy wrongs due to an emotional
attachment to their claims. Id. at 25.
33. Prosser, supra note 10, at 388.
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“overwhelming” majority of state courts, was in reality four distinct torts.34
Prosser labeled them: (1) intrusion; (2) public disclosure of private fact; (3)
false light in the public eye; and (4) appropriation.35 To defend his thesis,
Prosser cited numerous cases illustrating each of the four categories of his fourpart taxonomy.36
Prosser did not stop with a bare taxonomy. He also outlined the critical
elements of proof courts required for each of the four torts. For example,
Prosser observed that proof of conduct “which would be offensive or
objectionable to a reasonable man” was required in the case of intrusion;37 and
proof of publication or broadcast to more than a few persons was required in
the case of public disclosure.38 In addition, Prosser ventured to characterize the
different interests at stake in the recognition of each tort. He associated mental
repose with intrusion, good reputation with false light in the public eye, and
property with appropriation.39 Prosser further noted common features of the
torts, such as the “personal” nature of the rights conferred 40 and the availability
of typical tort damages.41 Recognizing a “head-on collision with the
constitutional guaranty of freedom of the press,”42 Prosser argued that liability
and recovery in invasion of privacy cases were significantly affected by the
plaintiffs’ celebrity or public office and the news interest in the plaintiffs’
lives.43 Finally, Prosser identified common defenses to invasion of privacy
claims, starting with consent.44
In the conclusion to his article, Prosser distilled an array of skeptical
concerns about the privacy tort. It troubled him, first, that the courts had created
so complex a series of four torts from the “use of a single word”45 in the
Warren and Brandeis article; second, that the right’s existence narrows the
constitutional freedoms of speech and press; and, third, that privacy actions
crowd the established territory of other, more limited tort actions—chiefly,
34. Id. at 386.
35. Id. at 389.
36. Though it would become the most influential, the 1960 article was not the first to
introduce Prosser’s taxonomy. Prosser may have debuted it in articles written in the mid-1930s.
See Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Prosser’s Privacy Law: A Mixed Legacy, 98 Calif.
L. Rev. (forthcoming 2010). Suggestive of his influence even before 1960, the taxonomy
appears, minus the false light tort, in the 1956 case Housh v. Peth, in which the state of Ohio first
recognized the right to privacy. Housh v. Peth, 133 N.E.2d 340, 343 (Ohio 1956). There the court
distinguished three causes of action: (1) “the unwarranted appropriation or exploitation of one’s
personality”; (2) “the publicizing of one’s private affairs with which the public has no legitimate
concern”; and (3) wrongful intrusion into one’s private activities.” Id. at 341.
37. Prosser, supra note 10, at 391.
38. Id. at 393–94.
39. Id. at 392.
40. Id. at 408.
41. Id. at 408–09.
42. Id. at 410.
43. Id. at 410–15.
44. Id. at 419.
45. Id. at 422.
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infliction of emotional distress and defamation.46 He was also troubled that the
privacy torts were unbounded enough to encourage suits over trivialities or
intrusions brought on oneself: “a lady who insists upon sun-bathing in the nude
in her own back yard” invites “neighbors [to] examine her with appreciation
and binoculars.”47
As Reporter for the American Law Institute’s Restatement (Second) of
Torts, Prosser enshrined his descriptive taxonomy as positive law.48 The same
four invasion of privacy torts Prosser identified in the 1960 article were
included in the Restatement. Through the Restatement, Prosser may have
achieved the ultimate aim of his landmark 1960 article: he made it more likely
the bar and bench would “realize what we are doing, and give some
consideration to the question of where, if anywhere, we are to call a halt.”49 In
the fifty years since Prosser’s article, additional state high courts have
embraced the invasion of privacy tort. A few, however, have heeded Prosser’s
cautions and declined to embrace privacy actions premised on publication of
private facts or false light, citing First Amendment limitations,50 or citing the
adequacy of remedies in defamation and other torts. 51
B. LGBT Issues in Privacy Tort Litigation
Prosser has been described as “anti-gay.”52 Yet there is nothing in
principle “anti-gay” about the privacy torts he helped mold. Indeed, relying on
the promise of the Prosser’s four privacy torts, LGBT claimants and their
attorneys have sought monetary and injunctive relief. As the cases I discuss
here will reveal, LGBT plaintiffs have brought privacy claims because they
were spied on, insulted, disparaged, and whispered about. They have alleged
that the tortious publication of their sexual orientation has destroyed their jobs,
professions, businesses, families, and intimate personal relationships. The
proliferation of public lawsuits exposing the private lives of LGBT individuals
has illuminated the unfortunate reality that members of the LGBT community

46. Id.
47. Id. A real life version of this scenario unfolded in 2002 when television celebrity
Jennifer Anniston sued and eventually settled with various media defendants who published
photographs of her sunbathing at her home with her breasts exposed. The photographs were taken
by professional paparazzi. See Anniston Snaps Case ‘Is Settled’, Birmingham Post, July 4,
2002, at 9.
48. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652A(2) (1977).
49. Prosser, supra note 10, at 423.
50. See e.g., Hall v. Post, 372 S.E.2d 711 (N.C. 1988) (rejecting public disclosure of
private facts tort on constitutional free speech grounds).
51. See e.g., Denver Publ’g Co. v. Bueno, 54 P. 3d 893 (Colo. 2002); Lake v. Wal-Mart
Stores, 582 N.W.2d 231 (Minn. 1998); Cain v. Hearst Corp., 878 S.W.2d 577 (Tex. 1994) (all
rejecting the false light tort as duplicative of the older defamation tort).
52. Professor Stephen Sugarman, Opening Remarks at the California Law Review
Symposium:
Prosser’s
Privacy
at
50
(Jan.
29,
2010),
available
at
http://www.californialawreview.org/information/prosser-info.
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do not fully benefit in everyday life from the rules of “deference and
demeanor” that otherwise govern civil relationships.53
For example, common private places are not reliably private for the LGBT
community. Neither a restroom stall54 nor a bedroom55 is free from intrusion.
Members of a society that once told gays and lesbians to closet themselves
have, in effect, crept into the closet with them to peep at and punish what goes
on inside.56 Straight husbands and wives have publicized their gay, lesbian, or
bisexual spouses’ sexual orientation,57 sometimes hoping to prevail in a child
custody battle.58 Even more unfortunate, the cases surveyed in this Article
reveal that the history of the privacy tort is not a simple “us versus them” story.
The LGBT community has invaded the privacy of its own members. For
instance, in 2002 a gay model sued a well-meaning gay lifestyles magazine for
using his photographs to illustrate a story about the dangers of unprotected sex
and excessive drug use in a narrow segment of gay culture to which the model
did not belong.59 In 1997, a closeted gay man sued his vindictive ex-lover who
had revealed his sexual orientation to his employer, mother and neighbors.60
In Parts II–V below, I examine privacy tort suits brought by LGBT
plaintiffs (and by persons accurately or inaccurately characterized as LGBT by
others). These plaintiffs have been willing to bring lawsuits, knowing that
53. Erving Goffman The Nature of Deference and Demeanor, 58 Am.
Anthropologist 473, 475–99 (1956). According to Goffman,
In all societies rules of conduct tend to be organized into codes which guarantee that
everyone acts appropriately and receives his due. In our society the code which governs
substantive rules and substantive expressions comprises our law, morality, and ethics,
while the code which governs ceremonial rules and ceremonial expressions is
incorporated in what we call etiquette.
Id. at 476–77.
Nor do persons perceived as belonging to the LGBT population get the benefits of civility.
See Complaint for Libel, False Light, Intentional Interference with Business Relations, Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress, and Injunctive Relief, Thompson v. Doe, No. 2010CV183037
(Ga. Super. Ct. Mar. 19, 2010) [hereinafter Complaint for Thompson] (Atlanta adult entertainment
dancer “Nairobi” sued rapper/comedian whose derogatory Twitter message suggested she was a
man in drag).
54. See Elmore v. Atl. Zayre, Inc., 341 S.E.2d 905, 905 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986).
55. See Plaxico v. Michael, 735 So. 2d 1036, 1038 (Miss. 1999) (lesbian photographed
partially nude by lover’s peeping Tom ex-husband).
56. See Elmore, 341 S.E.2d 905.
57. Ex-husbands have also uncloseted ex-wives. See, e.g., Weaver v. Nebo Sch. Dist., 29 F.
Supp. 2d 1279, 1284 (D. Utah 1998) (holding that school district’s restrictions on lesbian teacher’s
right to express her sexual orientation outside the classroom impermissibly infringed teacher’s
First Amendment rights in case where school teacher’s ex-husband revealed her lesbian sexual
orientation to others); see also Crumrine v. Harte-Hanks Television, Inc., 37 S.W.3d 124 (Tex.
App. 2001) (affirming summary judgment in favor of television station on First Amendment
ground that the publication of private fact was of “legitimate public concern” in case where gay
HIV positive father and police officer in custody battle with ex-wife who revealed his status to
media).
58. See Plaxico, 735 So. 2d 1036.
59. Prince v. Out Publ’g, No. B140475, 2002 WL 7999 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 3, 2002).
60. Doe v. S.B.M., 488 S.E.2d 878, 880 (S.C. Ct. App. 1997).
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litigation would render hidden details of their personal lives more public. Like
most privacy tort plaintiffs, LGBT plaintiffs ironically suffer publicity in order
to use the tort system to remedy perceived invasions of their privacy.
Occasionally, privacy plaintiffs manage to sue anonymously,61 but most file
publicly available lawsuits under their own names alleging one or more of
Prosser’s four torts: intrusion, publication of private fact, false light, and
appropriation. I begin with LGBT intrusion cases.
II
INTRUSION
“Intrusion” is the name Prosser gave to the first of the four invasion of
privacy torts discussed in his 1960 article.62 “It appears obvious,” Prosser
wrote, “that the interest protected by this branch of the tort is primarily a
mental one.”63 The intrusion tort has arisen, he stated vaguely, “chiefly to fill in
the gaps left by trespass, nuisance, the intentional infliction of mental distress,
and whatever remedies there may be for the invasion of constitutional rights.”64
According to Prosser, physical trespass into private domains is the paradigm of
intrusion, but non-trespassory wiretapping and harassing debt-collection phone
calls can be privacy intrusions too.65 Prosser pointed out that courts had found
attempts to access private documents, such as bank records or work papers, to
constitute intrusion.66 But Prosser detected reluctance on the part of the courts
to view either noise nuisances or insulting words and gestures as intrusions.67
Moreover, “[o]n the public street, or in any other public place, the plaintiff has
no right to be alone.”68 It is “clear that the intrusion must be something which
would be offensive or objectionable to a reasonable man.”69
This Part examines these aspects of the intrusion tort, and concludes that,
in operation, the tort has proven to be an unreliable remedy for LGBT
plaintiffs. This Part also identifies what I describe as four different categories
or types of intrusion offenses that LGBT intrusion tort plaintiffs have alleged:

61. See, e.g., Doe v. Templeton, No. 03 C 5076, 2004 WL 1882436 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 6,
2004) (lesbian plaintiff tricked into being photographed with imposter posing as famous
skateboarder Tony Hawk sued for publication of photograph with caption she believed revealed to
others her sexual orientation for the first time).
62. See Prosser, supra note 10, at 389. The rule is stated in the Restatement (Second) of
Torts as “[o]ne who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion
of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his
privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.” Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 652B (1977).
63. Prosser, supra note 10, at 392.
64. Id. at 392.
65. Id. at 389–90.
66. Id. at 390.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 391.
69. Id. at 390–91.
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(1) physical intrusion and surveillance; (2) verbal intrusion and prying; (3)
verbal insult and disparagement; and (4) intrusive publication of private fact.
Non-LGBT plaintiffs could theoretically experience—and have in fact
experienced—all four categories of intrusion offenses. But the facts behind the
case law suggest that an LGBT sexual orientation or identity can provoke
especially thoughtless and egregious intrusion offenses, reflective of a social
context of prejudice, homophobia, and discrimination.
A. Intrusion: Physical Intrusion and Surveillance
Given its surface potential, the intrusion tort has been surprisingly
unhelpful to several LGBT plaintiffs in the years since Prosser’s 1960 article
defined its parameters. In cases of physical intrusion and surveillance of LGBT
persons, courts have all too often deemed the defendants’ conduct reasonable.
In Elmore v. Atlantic Zayre, Inc.,70 the plaintiff-appellant unsuccessfully
appealed a summary judgment order entered on behalf of a retail store at which
he was arrested and charged with sodomy. Following a customer’s complaint
that homosexual activity was taking place in a restroom, store employees
peeked through a crack in the restroom ceiling and observed Mr. Elmore in a
toilet stall.71 Elmore filed a complaint for intrusion upon seclusion alleging that
the defendants spied on him “in a private place.”72 Plaintiff-appellant Elmore
argued that private citizens do not have the right to spy and should leave law
enforcement surveillance to the police.73 Elmore also denied that he was
engaged in sodomy. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the
retail defendants; the Court of Appeals of Georgia affirmed.74
The Court of Appeals found that “[a]n individual clearly has an interest in
privacy within a toilet stall.”75 However, the court found the defendants’
intrusion reasonable—not highly offensive to a reasonable person as the tort
requires. The right to privacy in a public restroom stall is not absolute, the court
stressed.76 The restroom in question was for the use of customers, and the
defendant had a duty to keep its restrooms free of crime.77 Moreover, the
spying activity was ignited by the store’s loss-prevention manager’s
observation and complaint of “highly suspicious”78 activity in the restroom.

70. 341 S.E.2d 905, 905 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 906.
74. Id. at 907.
75. Id. at 906.
76. Id. (citing Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1906)); see also
Anita L. Allen, Driven Into Society: Philosophies of Surveillance Take to the Streets of New York,
Amsterdam L. F. (2009), available at ojs.ubvu.vu.nl/alf/article/download/92/157 (noting
that there is a privacy interest in conduct in public places that has limits and is not absolute).
77. Elmore, 341 S.E.2d at 906.
78. Id. at 905.
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Although a typical restroom open to the general public of all ages in a
department store is not an appropriate place for sexual activity, the conduct of
the defendants was reprehensible. Measures to abate sexual activity in toilet
stalls do not have to include peeping at individuals through concealed openings.
The defendant employees easily could have investigated their suspicions of
merchandise theft or of sexual activity in a way that respected the privacy and
dignity of persons inside the stall. If suspicious activity seemed to be occurring,
for instance, they might have knocked on the door of the stall and asked anyone
inside to come out. Instead, they engaged in surreptitious peeping, which, on
these facts, a reasonable person could view as intrusion.
Carlos Ball has argued, with respect to the Supreme Court, that “the
Court’s geographization of sexual liberty has resulted in the protection of
sexual conduct that takes place in the home (and, presumably, in analogous
sites such as hotel rooms) while leaving unprotected sexual conduct that occurs
in public sites” such as restrooms.79 However, gays, lesbians and bisexuals
have a problem whether sexual liberty is formally “geographized” or not. The
geographization of sexual liberty alone cannot ensure adequate legal protection
for the compliant LGBT population that discretely limits sex to approved
domestic and similar sites. The holding of Lawrence v. Texas leaves lower
courts free to refuse the protection of the intrusion tort to lovers who are
members of the same sex even when their consensual adult sexual activity has
occurred in a private bedroom.80
Plaxico v. Michael illustrates that the private home is not a sanctuary for
intimate sex for LGBT individuals where courts view homosexual relationships
as illicit.81 Glenn Michael was divorced, and his ex-wife had custody of their
six-year-old daughter.82 Michael learned his ex-wife was involved in a lesbian
relationship with Rita Plaxico.83 Michael drove to his ex-wife’s cabin, crept up
to a window, peered inside, and watched the couple having sex.84 He returned
to his vehicle, retrieved a camera, and photographed Plaxico half-naked on the
bed.85 Michael then filed for a modification of child custody, using the
surreptitiously snapped photos of Plaxico during the trial.86 The court granted

79. Carlos A. Ball, Privacy, Property, and Public Sex, 18 Colum. J. Gender & L.
1, 4 (2008). Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965), indeed tie sexual privacy to the bedroom. But see Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
(1967) (holding that a man engaged in illegal activities in a phone booth on a public street has a
legitimate expectation of privacy for Fourth Amendment purposes).
80. Lawrence struck down criminal prohibitions on gay sex. It does not dictate that private
intrusions into the bedrooms of gay persons must be ruled “highly offensive to a reasonable
person” in state court tort actions. Restatement (Second) Torts § 652B (1977).
81. 735 So. 2d 1036 (Miss. 1999).
82. Id. at 1038.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
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him custody of his minor child.87 Subsequently Plaxico filed suit for intrusion
upon seclusion and solitude.88 The Circuit Court of Tippah County rejected the
suit, and the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed.89
Like the plaintiff in Elmore, Plaxico lost because the court found secret,
illegal surveillance of suspected homosexual activity justified due to the
suspected activity’s illicit and possibly illegal character.90 The majority held
that Plaxico failed to prove that Michael’s actions were “highly offensive to the
ordinary person.”91 Although he spied and photographed sexual intimacies, he
was prompted to do so to protect his daughter from exposure to an “illicit
lesbian sexual relationship.”92 The court concluded that most people would find
the purpose of the defendant’s spying “justified.”93
The court emphasized, curiously and perhaps disingenuously, that it was
not Michael’s ex-wife’s homosexuality that made her a suspect custodial
parent. According to the court, the result in Plaxico’s case would have been the
same if the ex-wife had had an “illicit” affair with a man.94 The court did not
define “illicit.” It left it to readers of its opinion to speculate about what would
make a particular affair illicit. The court may have been alluding to the fact that
certain heterosexual sex acts were illegal or had legal implications (e.g., sex
with a married person, sex with an animal, sex with a minor, sex with a firstdegree relative, oral sex, or anal sex), but the court neglected to provide explicit
clarification.
A dissenting judge agreed with Rita Plaxico that “peeping into the
bedroom window of another is a gross invasion of privacy,” and that the end
did not justify the means.95 A second dissenting opinion described defendant
Michael’s act as “voyeuristic”96 and suggested that because Plaxico was not
party to the custody dispute, Michael did not have a right to take her picture.
His ex-wife’s picture might have been sufficient. One could argue, though, that
on the facts of the case Michael’s ex-wife would have had an intrusion claim as
strong as her lover’s.

87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1040.
90. Prior to Lawrence v. Texas, oral sex and anal sex could be criminalized. Many states
kept on the books rarely enforced laws criminalizing these acts when performed by heterosexuals
and/or homosexuals. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003) (“In those States where
sodomy is still proscribed, whether for same-sex or heterosexual conduct, there is a pattern of
nonenforcement with respect to consenting adults acting in private.”).
91. Plaxico, 735 So. 2d at 1040.
92. Id. at 1039.
93. Id. at 1040.
94. Id. at 1040.
95. Id. at 1040 (Banks, J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 1041 (McRae, J., dissenting).
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B. Intrusion: Verbal Intrusion, Prying
Asking inappropriate personal questions and demanding personal
information are common forms of what I call “verbal intrusion.” Asking
invasive questions about sex and sexual orientation can amount to offensive
verbal intrusion. Given the history of employment discrimination and violence
targeting LGBT persons, a gay or lesbian employee could be expected to find
even casual inquiries about sexual orientation in the workplace “highly
offensive.” By contrast, a heterosexual employee might be offended by
intrusive questions, but would not expect to risk injury or lose his or her job or
social status for providing truthful answers.97
In Madsen v. Erwin, Christine Madsen was fired from her writing post at
the church-affiliated Christian Science Monitor when her lesbian sexual
orientation became public.98 Madsen had no luck persuading some members of
the Massachusetts high court that her supervisor tortiously intruded into her
privacy by asking about her sexual orientation.99 Madsen sued the supervisor,
the newspaper, the church, and several key officials in the church in a
complaint alleging wrongful discharge, defamation, invasion of privacy,
intentional infliction of mental distress, and other claims.100 Among her privacy
claims, Madsen argued that the defendants disclosed information about her
personal life to the public and placed her in a false light.101
The Christian Science Monitor defendants lost their motion to dismiss and
summary judgment motions, but the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
reversed in their favor on a key issue. The main question presented in the case
was whether the First Amendment free exercise principle allowed the Christian
Science Church to terminate Madsen’s employment on account of her sexual
orientation.102 The court held that the church had a right of religious freedom
under both federal and state constitutions to discharge Madsen.103 Yet, while
the court noted that Madsen’s allegations in her complaint “do not survive
attack by motion to dismiss,” it allowed the plaintiff to amend her complaint
with regard to the tort claims. 104 The court did not fully discuss the merits of
those claims. In his separate opinion, Justice Francis Patrick O’Connor hinted
that her privacy claims were likely to fail on privacy tort theories. The justice

97. Cf. Phillips v. Smalley Maint. Servs., Inc., 711 F.2d 1524 (11th Cir. 1983)
(heterosexual married woman lost job after refusing to provide oral sex and answers to employer’s
intrusive questions about her sex life).
98. Madsen v. Erwin, 481 N.E.2d 1160 (Mass. 1985).
99. Id. at 1167.
100. Id. at 1161.
101. Id. at 1172.
102. Id. at 1163–66; cf. Gunn v. Mariners Church, 84 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1, 7 (Cal. Ct. App.
2008) (holding that “the ministerial exception . . . bars courts from reviewing employment
decisions by religious organizations affecting employees who have religious duties of ministers”).
103. Madsen, 481 N.E.2d at 1165–66.
104. Id. at 1167.
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reasoned that since the church could lawfully discharge the plaintiff because of
her sexual orientation, by implication it could also question her about her
sexual orientation.105
In another verbal intrusion case, Morenz v. Progressive Casualty Ins. Co.,
an employee similarly argued that being asked about his homosexual identity at
work was intrusive.106 However, a coworker rather than a supervisor asked
plaintiff Ralph Morenz about his sexual orientation, and the alleged prying was
not accompanied by the threat of termination. Soon after Morenz’s company
transferred him to a new office, a fellow employee there asked him whether he
was gay.107 The coworker apparently asked the question because he wanted to
make sure that Morenz knew his sexual orientation would not be a problem on
the job.108
In his suit Morenz complained of intrusion, isolation, and emotional
distress due to his employer’s cruel lack of responsiveness to his inability to
cope with gruesome aspects of his responsibilities as an accident claims
adjuster.109 The court concluded that under the circumstances of the case the
question, “Are you gay?” was not “highly offensive to a reasonable person, and
indeed, not offensive at all.”110
The conclusion that the question is not offensive at all cuts off fact-finding
and analysis concerning whether non-maliciously intended questions about
sexual orientation could be offensive to a reasonable person. They might be
highly offensive to a reasonable person because they are personal, patronizing,
or presumptuous. They may be highly offensive because they enable potentially
sensitive data to be shared with others in the workplace who may be less openminded and well-intended than the person who first posed the question. Unless
courts consider factors such as gossip and discrimination vital to understanding
the full context of the LGBT workplace experience, they will continue to
conclude—often erroneously—that verbal intrusions against LGBT individuals
are not “highly offensive to a reasonable person.”
C. Intrusion: Verbal Insult and Disparagement
Courts have often asserted that the privacy torts protect feelings and
sensibilities.111 Plaintiffs have brought intrusion claims because they have felt

105. Id. at 1172.
106. Morenz v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., No. 79979, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 2474 (Ohio
Ct. App. May 23, 2002).
107. Id. at **5.
108. Id. at **5.
109. Id. at **11–12. Morenz did not like his new post, which required him to handle
insurance claims stemming from very serious accidents. Id. at **4–5. His employer was
unresponsive to his requests for reassignment, and Morenz experienced symptoms of posttraumatic stress disorder. Id. at **5.
110. Id. at **5.
111. Hence courts have repeatedly held that corporations, as fictitious entities without
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insulted or disparaged by the use of unkind words.
In Logan v. Sears, for example, a gay salon owner was speaking to a Sears
employee by telephone when he overheard her describing him as “queer as a
three-dollar bill.”112 Because the offensive language came to him over his own
private phone line, he felt the unkindness constituted an intrusion.113 The court
agreed that the statement made by Sears’s representative “was an intrusion
upon Logan’s solitude or seclusion,”114 but found that it was not so extreme or
outrageous as to offend an ordinary person. The word “queer,” according to the
court, has been used for a longer time than the new term “gay.”115 Thus, the use
of the word “queer” could not be described as “atrocious and intolerable in
civilized society.”116 The court concluded that, because the plaintiff was truly
gay, the use of the word “queer,” even though discouraged by the homosexual
community at the time, did not cause humiliation.117 The court opined that in
order to create a cause of action, the tortious conduct needed to cause mental
suffering, shame, or humiliation to a reasonable person, “not [be] conduct
which would be considered unacceptable merely by homosexuals.”118 It is
unclear and never explained why the perspectives of a “reasonable”
homosexual should be discounted in applying the standard “highly offensive to
a reasonable person.”
Unkind epithets have a greater chance of leading to actionable tort
claims—either emotional distress claims or privacy invasion claims—when the
epithets are combined with unlawful deeds. In Leibert v. Transworld Systems, a
California man disparaged as “effeminate” and “a fag” alleged that he was
discharged because of his homosexual orientation.119 The court concluded that
his suit stated a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress when
viewed in the context of a pattern of workplace harassment and loss of
employment in violation of state law.120 Similarly, but under privacy theories, a

feelings and sensibilities, can have no common law right to privacy. See Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 652I cmt. c (1977). See generally Anita L. Allen, Rethinking the Rule
Against Corporate Privacy Rights: Some Conceptual Quandaries for the Common Law, 20 J.
Marshall L. Rev. 607 (1987).
112. Logan v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 466 So. 2d 121, 122 (Ala. 1985).
113. Id. at 123.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 123–24.
116. Id. at 123.
117. Id. at 124.
118. Id.
119. Leibert v. Transworld Sys., Inc. 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 65, 66 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995)
(appellant alleged that he suffered discrimination based on his sexual orientation, violations of
privacy rights protected under California’s state constitution, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress).
120. Id. at 73 (“Employment discrimination, whether based upon sex, race, religion or
sexual orientation, is invidious and violates a fundamental public policy of this state. . . . We
conclude that he stated viable claims for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy and
intentional infliction of emotional distress.”).
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lesbian businesswoman successfully alleged in Simpson v. Burrows that
“Concerned Citizens of Christmas Valley” intentionally destroyed her business
and personal life by distributing threatening and false anti-lesbian diatribes,
including a letter attacking her as a “fag.”121 It is doubtful Simpson would have
prevailed on a privacy theory had she complained of being called a fag but had
not also lost her partner and livelihood.
D. Intrusion: Intrusive Publication of Private Facts
To establish a prima facie case of “intrusion,” plaintiffs must allege a
highly offensive intrusion that may or may not lead to a publication of any
information obtained as a consequence of intrusion. To establish a prima facie
case of “publication of private fact,” plaintiffs must allege that defendants
disseminated private facts to others, whether orally or in writing. Intrusion
claims have sometimes been accompanied by claims for publication of private
fact. Blurring the distinction between two of Prosser’s torts, LGBT plaintiffs
experience unwanted publicity as a kind of intrusion. We might call the offense
“intrusive publication of private facts.” The essence of these cases in not an
allegation of physical intrusion, prying, or disparagement, but instead an
allegation that it is intrusion into private life for others to reveal one’s secrets or
to dredge up embarrassments.
1. Secrets Revealed
In Prince v. Out Publishing, gay actor and model Tony Sabin Prince lost a
case in which he claimed numerous privacy torts, including publication of
private fact and intrusion.122 As I will elaborate in Part III, defendant Out
magazine published photos of the plaintiff in an article entitled “Dirty
Dancing.”123 The article described various improprieties at gay men’s “circuit
parties,” including abuse of illicit drugs and unsafe sexual practices.124 The
article included three photographs of Mr. Prince.125 The first photograph
occupied two pages of the magazine and pictured Prince shirtless, dancing with
another man.126 The second pictured Prince’s torso and face, and the third
pictured his face alone.127 The photographs of the plaintiff were taken without
his permission at a party in Los Angeles, where cameras were supposedly not
permitted.128
Prince alleged that the photos implied he was gay, a drug user, and a

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Simpson v. Burrows, 90 F. Supp. 2d 1108 (D. Or. 2000).
Prince v. Out Publ’g, No. B140475, 2002 WL 7999 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 3, 2002).
Id. at *1.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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person who engaged in unsafe sex.129 Prince was in fact gay.130 But he did not
abuse drugs, did not engage in unsafe sex, and did not attend the parties
described in the article.131 In response to Prince’s request, Out later published a
clarification, stating that the pictures accompanying the article in question were
taken at a different sort of party than the one described in the article, and that
“the appearance of any specific individuals in those photographs is not intended
to imply that they engage in any specific behaviors discussed in the article.”132
Still, Mr. Prince maintained that the photographs in Out exposed for the first
time his homosexual orientation to his family, professional associates, and
some of his friends.133
On his intrusion claim, the court determined that Prince did not have an
objective expectation of seclusion or solitude at the party he had attended,
because the public at large had been invited to purchase a ticket by phone, at
the door, or from the club, and approximately one thousand people attended the
party.134 If a person can be unlawfully stalked or sexually harassed in a
crowded public place,135 it is unclear why a person cannot be a victim of a
privacy intrusion while at a party. The courts could easily construe the targeting
of a person in a public place for a photograph intended for publication without
his consent as an unwelcome intrusion, as indeed they have in the past.136 But
arguably the relevant intrusion at issue was the magazine’s interference with
the plaintiff’s partially secret personal life through the inadvertent “outing” and
potential character distortion.
2. Embarrassments Dredged Up
The memorable “Boys of Boise” case, Uranga v Federated Publications,
commenced when plaintiff Fred Uranga sued an Idaho newspaper for privacy
invasion (including intrusion) and infliction of emotional distress. The Idaho
Statesman published a photographic copy of a forty-year old statement made to
authorities by a man named Melvin Dir, who implicated Uranga in homosexual
activities. Mr. Dir had been prosecuted for sex felonies, including forcing
teenager Frank Jones to submit to oral sex. Dir claimed the sex was consensual
and that Jones had led him to believe he had had earlier homosexual encounters
with his cousin Fred Uranga and a high school classmate.137
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at *2.
133. Id. at *2.
134. Id. at *8.
135. Cf. Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973) (popular former First Lady
Jacqueline Kenney Onassis sought and obtained an injunction requiring photographer to keep a
safe distance from her and her children John and Carolyn Kennedy).
136. See, e.g., id.
137. Uranga v. Federated Publ’ns, Inc., 67 P.3d 29, 31 (Idaho 2003) (aftermath of infamous
scandal in which hundreds of people were suspected of involvement in soliciting homosexual
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Uranga’s failed claim of intrusion was modeled on claims made in what
are generally considered “private fact” cases such as Melvin v. Reid and
Briscoe v. Reader’s Digest.138 But there was a difference: Uranga did not admit
to the dredged-up embarrassing (to him) ascription of homosexuality, whereas
Melvin admitted prostitution and criminal prosecution, and Briscoe admitted to
hijacking.139 The court noted Uranga’s claim for intrusion, but said it had not
been clearly articulated in the lawsuit.140 Attempting to make sense of it, the
court speculated that the only possible intrusion at issue was an “intrusion” into
public court records that related to the plaintiff.141 Following the precedent of
two landmark Supreme Court cases, Florida Star v. B.J.F. and Cox
Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn,142 the Uranga court held that neither the
examination of public records nor their publication could be the basis for an
intrusion claim.143
And yet publication of allegations about one’s past sex life that one
regards as embarrassments can certainly feel like what in colloquial terms we
could describe as an intrusion. Uranga and Prince reflect a gap between the
broad, ordinary, informal conceptions of intrusion and the narrow formal legal
conception of the intrusion tort. The design of formal doctrine precluded hybrid
“intrusive publication” claims by Fred Uranga and Tony Sabin Prince. These
plaintiffs were forced separately to plead intrusion upon seclusion and
publication of private fact, losing on both causes of action.
E. Limited Utility
Overall, LGBT plaintiffs have not had much luck with the intrusion tort,
whether alleging surveillance, prying, insult, disparagement, or publicly
revealing partly hidden aspects of private life. Rita Plaxico’s memorable case

activity from minors associated with the YMCA in Boise, Idaho).
138. Melvin v. Reid, 297 P. 91 (Cal. Ct. App. 1931); Briscoe v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, 483
P.2d 34 (Cal. 1971).
139. Cf. Paul M. Schwartz, From Victorian Secrets to Cyberspace Shaming, 76 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 1407, 1414 (2009) (quoting Lawrence Friedman, Guarding Life’s Dark
Secrets: Legal and Social Controls over Reputation, Propriety,
and Privacy 218 (2009) (claiming that Melvin may have been an active prostitute at the time
she sued those responsible for calling attention to her history of homicide acquittal and
prostitution)).
140. Uranga, 67 P.3d at 32.
141. Id. at 32–33.
142. Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989) (holding that First Amendment bars press
liability in case where, in violation of state law, newspaper published name of woman who
survived a rape after inexperienced reporter copied her name from police reports inadvertently
made available to press); Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975) (holding that First
Amendment bars media liability in case where, in violation of state law, television station
broadcast name of murdered rape victim obtained from police records). The court also cited Baker
v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 587 P.2d 829 (Idaho 1978), where the court found no privacy
invasion where defendant has accessed court records. Uranga, 67 P.3d at 32.
143. Uranga, 67 P.3d at 35.
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against Glenn Michael is illustrative. Ms. Plaxico’s case did not survive a
motion to dismiss despite the fact that Mr. Michael had driven his truck to the
secluded cabin where she lived with his ex-wife, watched her through a
window having sex with his ex-wife, and photographed her partly nude and
seated on her bed.144 The appeals court found that this egregious invasion was
not “highly offensive to a reasonable person,” since “a reasonable person would
not feel Michael’s interference with Plaxico’s seclusion was a substantial one
that would rise to the required level of gross offensiveness.”145 Along with
Plaxico, other disappointed privacy tort plaintiffs were Prince, Uranga, Logan,
Madsen, Morenz, and Elmore.
Based on the cases I analyzed, the intrusion tort has not been, nor
promises to be, a useful a remedy for LGBT plaintiffs seeking monetary or
injunctive relief. One would draw a different conclusion upon discovery of a
cache of intrusion claims favorably settled by LGBT plaintiffs prior to pretrial
motions, judgments, and appeals. One would also draw a different conclusion
with strong empirical evidence of the intrusion tort’s deterrent effect. But in the
absence of evidence either of a strong deterrent effect or a history of favorable
settlements, I conclude based on the available evidence that the intrusion tort is
a tort of minimal practical utility to LGBT plaintiffs.
III
PUBLICATION OF PRIVATE FACT
Prosser’s publication of private fact tort146 is a favorite with privacy
litigants. Ill-fated publication actions have even been brought on behalf of the
dead.147 New technologies and contemporary lifestyles add to the avenues
through which actionable publication offenses can occur. In a recent case, a
lesbian sued the popular online movie-rental company Netflix, alleging that it
collected information on subscribers’ rental histories from which their sexual
orientations could be inferred and disclosed.148
144. Plaxico v. Michael, 735 So. 2d 1036, 1037 (Miss. 1999).
145. Id. at 1039.
146. The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides:
Publicity Given to Private Life
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another is
subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the matter publicized
is of a kind that (a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) is
not of legitimate concern to the public.
Restatement (Second) Torts § 652D (1977).
147. See e.g., Justice v. Belo Broad. Corp., 472 F. Supp. 145 (N.D. Tex 1979) (parents’
publication of private fact suit against media defendant who reported that their murdered son had
had a homosexual affair with his employer dismissed). The general common law rule applicable to
all of the privacy torts is that right to privacy actions survive death, but new privacy claims for
post death offenses are not actionable. See e.g., Flynn v. Higham, 197 Cal. Rptr. 145 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1983) (adult children’s false light privacy suit against media defendant who reported that
their deceased father was a homosexual and Nazi spy dismissed).
148. Valdez-Marquez v. Netflix Inc., No. C09-05903-JW-PVT (N.D. Cal. dismissed Mar.
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The LGBT community has had mixed luck with the publication of private
tort. On its face, a doctrine of civil liability for disclosures of private facts could
deter and redress unwanted revelations and “outings.” The tort has served well
several plaintiffs whose closeted gender traits, sexual orientation, or birth sex
were revealed to the public without their consent.149 But it failed to provide a
remedy for others.150 In many cases, plaintiffs’ failure to establish a
“publication” or “private fact” to the satisfaction of the court precluded
recovery. Instead or in addition, the First Amendment precluded a tort remedy
in some cases, effectively privileging media defendants eager to construe
nearly everything that preoccupies or vexes daily life as matters of legitimate
public interest.151
When Prosser addressed the public disclosure tort fifty years ago, he
volunteered no sidebar on how a public facts tort could deter or remedy
unwanted attention to the fact that someone is homosexual, bisexual or
transgender. But Prosser did reference Cason v. Baskin,152 a noteworthy public
disclosure of private fact case in which a woman sued a writer whose bestselling memoir portrayed her as having a striking mix of masculine and
feminine traits.153 Although Prosser mentioned in passing the celebrated Cross
Creek154 case and seemed to grasp that it concerned unwanted attention to
unconventional, culturally transgressive gender traits and sex roles, he nowhere
noted a distinct feature of the body of case law that included and surrounded it:
gender norms played a role in the development of the right to privacy and its
recognition by the courts.155 In its first decades, the right to privacy was often
29, 2010).
149. Borquez v. Ozer, 923 P.2d 166 (Colo. App. 1995) (disclosure of HIV status by
employer was wrongful publication of private fact), rev’d on other grounds, 940 P.2d 371 (Colo.
1997).
150. See, e.g., Cinel v. Connick 15 F.3d 1338, 1345 (5th Cir. 1994) (information contained
in public record is not “private”).
151. See, e.g., Crumrine v. Harte-Hanks Television, Inc., 37 S.W.3d 124, 127 (Tex. App.
2001) (television station story regarding a custody proceeding where one parent raised concerns
for the child’s safety is of legitimate public interest a protected by First Amendment, and facts
about sexual orientation and HIV status revealed in court are no longer private and may be
published with impunity by media).
152. Cason v. Baskin, 20 So. 2d 243 (Fla. 1944). Cason v. Baskin was the Florida courts’
first opportunity to embrace or to reject the right to privacy, and it embraced it. Id. at 244 (“The
first and the main question presented here is whether an action may be maintained in this State for
an invasion of the right of privacy.”). The papers concerning the trial and its defendant are
archived at U. Fla., George A. Smathers Libraries, A Guide to the Cross Creek
Trial
(Cason
v.
Baskin)
Papers,
http://web.uflib.ufl.edu/spec/manuscript/guides/CasonvBaskin.htm.
153. See generally Patricia Nassif Acton, Invasion of Privacy: The
Cross Creek Trial of Marjorie Kinnan Rawlings (1988).
154. Marjorie Kinnan Rawlings, Cross Creek (1942).
155. See generally Anita L. Allen & Erin Mack, How Privacy Got Its Gender, 10 N.
Ill. U. L. Rev. 441 (1990) (arguing that concerns about the need to protect women’s
privacy spirited the early development of privacy law); cf. Robert E. Mensel, The AntiProgressive Origins and Uses of the Right to Privacy in the Federal Courts 1860–1937, 3 Fed.
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asserted by women—and on women’s behalf—to vindicate the women’s
perceived interest in modesty, seclusion, propriety, and genteel refinement.156
Cason v. Baskin fits the pattern of privacy suits brought to vindicate female
character: “You have made a hussy out of me” was the plaintiff’s accusation to
her defendant.157
A. Public Attention to Unconventional Gender Traits and Sex Roles
In Cason v. Baskin, quaintly designated “feme sole” Zelma Cason, a rural
Alachua County social worker and census-taker, sued to recover $100,000 from
her friend and neighbor, the Pulitzer Prize-winning author Marjorie Kinnan
Baskin (pen name Marjorie Kinnan Rawlings).158 In 1942, Baskin published
Cross Creek, an autobiographical work containing character portraits of her
friends and neighbors, including her friend Zelma Cason.159 One chapter of the
memoir recounted Baskin’s observations as she accompanied Cason on
horseback on her census-taking duties in Florida’s backwoods. Baskin depicted
Cason colorfully as “an ageless spinster resembling an angry and efficient
canary.”160 She described her as competent in the management of her orange
groves, nurturing, and at ease among Negros.161 “I cannot decide whether she
should have been a man or a mother [as she] combines the more violent
characteristics of both,”162 Baskin wrote. Never using her subject’s surname,
Baskin quoted Cason’s use of salty expressions such as “sons of [bitches],”
“those [bastards],” and “It’s a [goddamn] blessing.”163
Cason denied the accuracy of Baskin’s portrayal and alleged defamation
as well as privacy invasion. The court framed Cason’s complaint as one about
the defendant’s publication of sensitive private facts, even though Baskin’s
“vivid and intimate character sketch” did not reveal much of anything about
Cason that was not already generally known or believed true in her
community.164 As weak as her privacy claim may have been, Cason’s libel
claims were weaker. Trial witnesses affirmed that Cason had a temper, cursed
frequently, and generously provided charitable succor to the poor, as Baskin

Cts. L. Rev. 109, 112 (2009) (citing 19th-century federal court cases in which judges
rendered opinions “valuing female privacy more than male” and reflecting “prevailing bourgeois
understandings of gender and race”).
156. See generally Allen & Mack, supra note 155.
157. Acton, supra note 153, at 24.
158. Cason, 20 So. 2d at 244–45.
159. Rawlings, supra note 154. See the blog devoted to the Cross Creek Trial, which
includes discussion of the woman-as-man discourse, http://crosscreektrial.com/2009/12/a-bunchof-mannish-hussies/.
160. Cason, 20 So. 2d at 245.
161. Id. at 245–46 (quoting passages from Rawlings, supra note 154).
162. Cason, 20 So. 2d at 245.
163. Id. at 245–46.
164. Id. at 247. The memoir was offensive to Cason more because of what it called
attention to than because of what it revealed.
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described.165 Moreover, “it was hard to ignore Zelma’s masculine leanings.” 166
Cason won at trial. On appeal, the Florida Supreme Court held that “in
spite of the fact that the publication complained of, considered as a whole,
portrays the plaintiff as a fine and attractive personality,” Cason had stated a
cause of action potentially worthy of at least nominal damages for invasion of
her private life.167 The court speculated that Cason might be one of those
people who “do not want their acts of charity publicized” in a book’s “vivid
and intimate character sketch.”168 The Florida high court pointed to Cason’s
“acts of charity”169 as the facts she preferred to downplay, bringing to mind
Schuyler v. Curtis.170 By contrast, Prosser stressed Cason’s “masculine
characteristics” as the private facts she had wished to downplay. Prosser
summarized Cason’s injury as publication of “embarrassing details of a
woman’s masculine characteristics, her domineering tendencies, her habits of
profanity, and incidents of her personal conduct towards friends and
neighbors.”171 Prosser got closer to the truth than the Florida court. Cason
reportedly felt angry and betrayed by a friend rather than embarrassed about
any specific public disclosures.172 Cason was furious when she read what
Baskin wrote about her.173 When they met after the book’s publication, Cason
accused Baskin of making a “hussy” out of her.174 Cason, who sat knitting
demurely throughout her trial,175 was offended that by writing about her as she
did, her friend Baskin portrayed her as a cultural abomination, a morally
transgressing female.176
B. Gay, Straight or Bisexual: Public Attention to Sexual Orientation
Efforts to reinforce gender norms are a recognized dimension of privacy
case law, including the publication of private fact cases of which Cason is an

165. Acton, supra note 153, at 31, 92–94.
166. Id. at 30 (“She wore pants at every possible opportunity, taught her niece and nephew
to shoot, and enjoyed an occasional boxing match. And she was not above a show of violence if it
suited her purposes.”).
167. Cason, 20 So. 2d at 247.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Schuyler v. Curtis, 15 N.Y.S. 787, 788 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1891) (family sought to prevent
the public display of a bust created in the image of a woman philanthropist who was a “woman of
great refinement and cultivation”).
171. Prosser, supra note 10, at 393.
172. Acton, supra note 153, at 144. But see id. at 144 (“Though she was never completely
happy with her portrayal in Cross Creek, Zelma found it in her heart to forgive Marjorie . . . .”).
173. Id. at 24, 25.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 80–81 (“As Zelma knitted, her ball of yarn—through intent or accident—
repeatedly fell from her lap and rolled under the table. [The defendant’s husband, Norton] Baskin,
being the gentleman that he was, stooped down each time to retrieve it.”).
176. Id. at 24; see also id. at 115 (counsel for plaintiff arguing rhetorically that defendant
Baskin might be unaware that in the deep South “‘old maid’ is a fighting term”).
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especially interesting early example. What of sexual orientation and sexual
identity related norms? Has the privacy tort been deployed to reinforce them as
well? The answer is that to an extent LGBT plaintiffs (of both sexes) have
sought through the publication of private fact tort to preserve the problematic
convention of lives sheltered in layers of inaccessibility and reserve. Courts
have sometimes gone along, asserting that sexual orientation is private in
nature, as in Borquez v. Ozer.177
Robert P. Borquez was a successful associate in a law firm, terminated
after informing his employer that his male partner had recently received an
HIV-positive diagnosis.178 Before the disclosure Borquez hid his homosexual
orientation at work.179 After losing his job, he sued for wrongful discharge and
for wrongful publication of his sexual orientation and possible HIV status.180
The jury awarded $30,841 in lost wages for wrongful discharge, $20,000 for
embarrassment on the publication of private facts claim, and $40,000 in
exemplary damages.181 The appellate court affirmed,182 holding that sexual
orientation and exposure to HIV are private matters.183 Disclosing these details
is offensive to a reasonable person because both homosexuality and AIDS are
stigmatized.184 Further, the court held that disclosing information regarding
HIV was not in this instance disclosure of a matter of legitimate concern to the
public.185
Courts have not been uniform in their willingness to allow a tort recovery
when information or allegations about sexual orientation have come out.186 For
example, in Crumrine v. Harte-Hanks Television the court held that even if
homosexual identity is a private matter, the plaintiff policeman’s homosexual
identity and HIV positive status did not remain so once revealed during judicial
proceedings, such as a child custody proceeding.187
A similar outcome greeted a gay priest man in an earlier case, Cinel v.
Connick.188 Authorities found homosexual pornography in the residence of
Dino Cinel, a Roman Catholic priest, along with a videotape of him engaging
in consensual homosexual sex with two adult men.189 The defendants in the
case included several state officials who released the videotape to a reporter
177. 923 P.2d 166 (Colo. App. 1995), rev’d on other grounds, 940 P.2d 371 (Colo. 1997).
178. Id. at 169.
179. Id. at 169–70.
180. Id. at 170.
181. Id. at 171.
182. Id. at 179.
183. Id. at 172.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 173.
186. See, e.g,, Uranga v. Federated Publ’ns, Inc., 67 P.3d 29, 33 (Idaho 2003).
187. Crumrine v. Harte-Hanks Television, Inc., 37 S.W.3d 124 (Tex. App. 2001); see
generally Hilzendeger, supra note 12.
188. Cinel v. Connick, 15 F.3d 1338, 1345 (5th Cir. 1994).
189. Id. at 1340.
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and a television network. The television network broadcasted excerpts from the
tape.190 Plaintiff Cinel subsequently brought a Section 1983 claim against the
state officials for violating his constitutional privacy rights by disclosing the
names of the people who were taped having sex with him; by revealing their
identities to unrelated third parties; and by releasing the materials to private
litigants, including the church and the other participants in the sex acts.191 The
court rejected the claim, stating that the identities of the people and their
addresses were not part of the plaintiff’s private life.192 In addition, the church
and the participants in the sex acts had previous knowledge about the materials,
so the information was not private as to them.193 The state officials were
similarly shielded from liability, as they acted lawfully in disclosing materials
pursuant to a valid subpoena.194
Plaintiff Cinel also claimed a publication of private facts tort under
Louisiana Civil Code.195 The trial court rejected this claim, finding that the
materials were a matter of legitimate public concern since sodomy was a crime
at the time.196 In addition, the court concluded that identification of the
participants by state officials was a matter that needed to be reviewed by the
public.197 This public need was strengthened by the fact that plaintiff Cinel had
engaged in the private activity while he was a priest.198 Finally, the court
rejected the plaintiff’s claim that broadcasting the videotape added no value to
the story, even if it was not newsworthy.199 According to the court, it may have
been insensitive to publish the videotape, but the judiciary could not make
decisions for the media as to what should be published.200
The Uranga case introduced in Part II is reintroduced here alongside
Crumrine and Cinel, as another example of the failure of a publication of
private fact tort claim where concealments have come to light as a consequence
of public records and media reports.201 Fred Uranga brought an action against
the publisher of the Idaho Statesman daily newspaper.202 The newspaper
published an article accompanied by a photograph of a handwritten statement
by an accused sex offender implicating Uranga in youthful homosexual
activity.203

190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

Id. at 1341.
Id.
Id. at 1342–43.
Id.
Id. at 1343.
Id. at 1345.
Id. at 1346.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Uranga v. Federated Publ’ns, Inc., 67 P.3d 29 (Idaho 2003).
Id. at 31.
Id. at 30.
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Uranga filed a complaint for intrusion, publication of private facts, false
light, and intentional and/or reckless infliction of emotional distress.204 The trial
court granted a motion to dismiss in favor of the newspaper.205 The court of
appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court of Idaho vacated the judgment of the trial
court, but upon the newspaper’s petition for rehearing, the court reversed
itself.206 The court dismissed the publication of private facts claim on the
ground that the offending statement was on public record.207 The court held that
a statement implicating an individual in homosexual activity that happened
forty years earlier is not a private fact because the statement was part of a court
record available to the press.208
In distinguishing his claim from Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn,209
Uranga argued that in Cox the information concerned a current criminal
prosecution, while the statement to which he was objecting had been made to
police forty years earlier.210 The court rejected this distinction, stating that
freedom of speech does not have a timeline.211 Uranga also argued that his
name was not newsworthy.212 The court rejected this argument as well, citing
the Supreme Court decision in Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co.,213 which
held that determination of whether a publication is a matter of public concern is
based upon an examination of the publication as a whole.214 Even if Uranga’s
name was not newsworthy, the article about the Boys of Boise scandal was
newsworthy for First Amendment purposes.215 The dismissal of Uranga’s
intentional infliction of emotional stress claim was affirmed because the
newspaper enjoyed First Amendment protection.216
While the above cases show that the private fact theory has not guaranteed
victory for closeted homosexuals,217 they also show that courts are prepared to
204. Id. at 31.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 30. The high court rejected the intrusion claim because Uranga did not state any
kind of intrusion into a place, or any uncomfortable investigation. The newspaper only
investigated what was in the public record and did not intrude on Uranga’s seclusion. Id. at 32.
Uranga abandoned the false light claim, perhaps because he believed the court would find a duty
of verifying every court document quoted or reproduced to be an unreasonable burden on
newspapers.
207. Id. at 33.
208. Id.
209. Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975) (First Amendment bars media
liability for broadcasting the lawfully obtained identity and photograph of a rape and murder
victim despite a Georgia statute prohibiting the publication of the identities of rape victims).
210. Uranga, 67 P.3d at 35.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. 443 U.S. 97 (1979).
214. Uranga, 67 P.3d at 35.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Uranga’s actual sexual orientation is unclear. He denied the sexual involvement he felt
was implied by the statement and its republication in the Idaho Statesman.
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voice the ideal that sexual orientation is prima facie private. Simpson v.
Burrows, though its facts are extreme, reveals the possibility of complete
victory for a gay woman relying on the public disclosure or privacy fact tort.218
Jo Anne Simpson brought claims of intimidation, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, invasion of privacy, and libel against the defendant couple
Howard and Jean Burrows.219 Ms. Simpson and her female partner moved to
the small town of Christmas Valley, Oregon, where they purchased a
restaurant.220 Soon after their arrival and purchase of the restaurant, threatening
and offensive letters warning people against the lesbian couple were circulated
around town.221 Letters were sent to Simpson and her partner with threatening
content, such as “NO FAGS IN C.V. [Christmas Valley]” and “IT’S YOUR
TURN TO GO[,] HEAD FIRST OR FEET FIRST.”222 Letters were also sent to
other people and business owners in the town.223 They called on citizens to
boycott the restaurant due to the “perverts” who owned it, and they threatened
that the restaurant would turn into “a mecca for Queers, Lesbians, Perverts &
other degenerates.”224 The Burrows’ letters had a greatly adverse effect on
Simpson’s life225 and were among the principal reasons Simpson’s partner left
her and fled Christmas Valley.226 Simpson testified that she felt threatened and
lost trust in people, and even bought a gun for protection.227 In support of her
claim for economic damages, Simpson pointed out that as soon as the letter
distribution commenced, fewer people patronized her restaurant business and
she was forced to sell it at a loss.228
After finding the Burrowses responsible for sending the hateful letters that
ruined Simpson’s personal life and destroyed her livelihood,229 the court held in
favor for Simpson on her claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress,
intimidation, and publication of private facts. The court concluded that the
defendants intended to cause the plaintiff emotional distress and that their
behavior was virtually criminal.230 Though the Burrowses had the constitutional
right to dislike homosexuality and to express their views, those rights did not
grant them immunity from liability for direct threats.231
218. Simpson v. Burrows, 90 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1125 (D. Or. 2000).
219. Id. at 1112.
220. Id. at 1113.
221. Id. at 1114.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 1115.
224. Id. at 1114.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 1121.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 1120.
230. The court rejected Simpson’s libel claims because they were barred by the statute of
limitations and because defendants were entitled to their offensive opinions about the plaintiff’s
lesbian sexual orientation. Id. at 1124.
231. Id.
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With respect to the disclosure of private facts claim, the court found that
sexual orientation is a private fact that the defendants publicized to a large
number of people.232 The disclosure contained in the letters was “extremely
outrageous” and thus was of the “highly objectionable kind.”233 Based on her
valid privacy claims the court awarded Simpson $200,000 in noneconomic
damages, $52,500 in economic damages, and $5,000 in punitive damages.234
The Burrows case illustrates that privacy invasions are actionable not only
when unknown secrets are disclosed, but also when information is moved
without consent from one social network into another. The case thus represents
Professor Lior Strahilevitz’s theory in action:235 facts can be private, not merely
because they are secrets, but also because they are sensitive and have been
released into new social networks with malicious intent. The Burrows court
therefore implicitly endorsed an important point of view other courts have
not—that LGBT persons have a right to selective disclosure of their sexual
orientations.
C. Publication of Birth Sex of Transgender Persons
In an important California case in the tradition of Melvin v. Reid,236 the
court in Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, Inc. reasoned that a transgender person’s
birth sex is a private matter and not newsworthy per se, even if she has become
a public figure.237 Plaintiff-respondent Toni Diaz was a transgender woman
born as a biological male.238 She underwent a sex-corrective procedure in
1975.239 The surgery was a success, and society perceived Diaz as a woman.
She kept her former sex a secret, except to her immediate family and closest
friends.240 Selective disclosure to a small group enabled her to break with the
past, avoid constant scrutiny, and move on to enjoy a new life. She legally
changed her name, social security card, and driver’s license.241 After the
surgery, Diaz enrolled in the College of Alameda, and was eventually elected
as the student body president.242 She was the first woman to hold this office.243

232. Id. at 1125.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 1131.
235. See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy, 72 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 919 (2005).
236. Melvin v. Reid, 297 P. 91 (Cal. Ct. App. 1931) (filmmakers violated privacy of
woman whose past life as a prostitute and accused murderer was resurrected and turned into a
motion picture using her real name); see also Briscoe v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, 483 P.2d 34 (Cal.
1971). But see Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F 2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940).
237. Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, Inc., 188 Cal. Rptr. 762 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
238. Id. at 765.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.

allenCLRfinalNoPagination.doc (Do Not Delete)

12/1/2010 4:33 PM

130

[Vol. XX:nnn

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

Diaz did not reveal her birth sex to the student body at College of
Alameda.244 A columnist from the Oakland Tribune found out about her gender
reassignment surgery from confidential sources.245 In the process of seeking to
verify facts provided by those sources, the columnist discovered that before
surgery Diaz had been arrested as a male for soliciting an undercover
policeman but was never convicted of the crime.246 With proof of Diaz’s birth
sex in hand, the columnist published a mocking article revealing that Diaz had
been born a male.247
Diaz brought an action for publication of private facts.248 Diaz maintained
that the publication caused her depression, interrupted her college education,
and led to insomnia, nightmares, and memory lapses.249 The jury found that the
defendant newspaper and columnist who disclosed the plaintiff’s transsexual
identity had publicly disclosed private facts, that the facts were private and not
newsworthy, that the disclosure was highly offensive to a reasonable person,
that the defendants knew the disclosure was highly offensive, and that the
disclosure caused injury to the plaintiff.250 The jury awarded Diaz $250,000 in
compensatory damages and $525,000 in punitive damages.251
The defendants appealed, challenging the jury’s findings that the
plaintiff’s birth sex was a private fact and not newsworthy.252 The appeals court
reversed and ordered a new trial on two grounds: instructional error and failure
to meet the burden of proof of newsworthiness.253 While the trial court
instructed the jury that the defendant needed to present a “compelling public
need” in order to abridge the plaintiff’s privacy right,254 it should have
instructed that the defendant needed to show “legitimate interest” in exposing
the private facts.255 In addition, the trial court improperly instructed the jury
that the burden of proof was on the defendant to prove newsworthiness, when it
was actually the plaintiff who needed to prove that the publication was not
privileged.256
Although the appellate court ordered a new trial, it reflected on the merits
of the arguments and sided with plaintiff Diaz. This court, like the Oregon
court in the Simpson case, implicitly endorsed an interest in selective
disclosure. The court found that Diaz’s “sexual identity,” meaning her birth sex
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.

Id.
Id. at 766.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 762.
Id. at 766.
Id. at 768.
Id.
Id. at 762.
Id. at 769.
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and transgender status, was a private matter even though it was not a complete
secret. The court distinguished its determination from the Supreme Court ruling
in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn.257 In Cox, the Supreme Court ruled that the
father of a deceased rape victim could not file a publication of private facts tort
claim against the media outlets that disclosed his daughter’s name in
connection with the incident.258 The Supreme Court mainly based its decision
on the fact that the daughter’s name already appeared in the indictment.259 In
contrast, the court in Diaz found that the plaintiff’s birth information was not
part of the public record.260 Diaz took affirmative steps to alter the public
record to indicate her female identity.261 According to the public record of her
life, she was a female.262 The police record concerning the solicitation of an
officer did not even mention Diaz’s new female name263—the journalist made
the connection based on confidential sources rather than public records.264 The
court reasoned that even if the plaintiff’s original birth certificate could be
viewed as a public record, the defendants had not seen it before the article
published.265
The court then rejected the defendants’ argument that since plaintiff Diaz
was a public figure as the first female student body president of a public
college, the article they wrote and published was newsworthy.266 While the
court conceded that, as a matter of law, a person who seeks out a public
position waives his or her right to privacy, the court held that Diaz was at best a
“limited-purpose” public figure who did not abandon all privacy interests.267
The plaintiff’s status as the first female student body president did not mean
she was not entitled to keep her “domestic activities and sexual relations
private.”268 And the court found the plaintiff’s gender transformation would not
affect her honesty or judgment so as to render her publicly accountable for her
private life.269 Finally, the court rejected the defendant’s argument that the case
was newsworthy because it reflected a change in women’s positions in
society.270 In the court’s view, the columnist had no academic news intent.
257. Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
258. Id.; see also Diaz, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 771 (discussing the holding in Cox).
259. Cox, 420 U.S. at 496.
260. Diaz, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 771.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id. It is worth noting that original birth certificates are commonly sealed and not
available even to the people they concern; in most U.S. jurisdictions, adults adopted as infants and
seeking their “true” identities are for that reason alone not granted access to their original birth
certificates.
266. Id. at 766.
267. Id. at 773.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id.
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Rather, his clear attempt to mock the plaintiff undercut any claim that he was
trying to educate the public.271
The court also rejected the argument that awarding punitive damages was
improper because the plaintiff did not prove that the defendant acted with
malice or intent to injure.272 The court held that the defendant did not just
publish the article but had exacerbated Diaz’s injury by making her the “brunt
of a joke.”273 The columnist did not even bother to ask Diaz for her consent
prior to publishing the article (despite the lack of a deadline) but instead threw
his energies into efforts to acquire sensitive information about her.274 A
reasonable jury could have taken this disparity of effort as evidence of
malice.275 The court also found the newspaper liable for punitive damages
because it approved and published the columnist’s article.276
The court rejected the argument that the compensatory damages awarded
were excessive.277 The defendants argued that the special damages presented by
Diaz were only $800 for psychotherapy.278 The court concluded that the
damages were not limited to out-of-pocket losses, but included personal
suffering and humiliation.279 The court also ruled that the damages were not
easy to evaluate and should be left for the jury to decide.280 The Diaz case
sends a message that invading the privacy of a transgender woman is a serious
offense that can lead to liability in the form of substantial compensatory and
punitive damages.
In stark contrast to Diaz’s broad success with the merits of her privacy
claims, another court was less willing to view information dredged up about a
transgender person’s birth sex as private and not newsworthy. In Schuler v.
McGraw-Hill Cos., the plaintiff Eleanor Schuler, the CEO of Printron Inc., was
a male-to-female transgender woman.281 Schuler sued the publisher of Business
Week and its employees for publishing an article that allegedly defamed her,
interfered with her business relations, invaded her privacy, and caused her
emotional distress.282 Published in 1994, the article criticized the American
Stock Exchange (AMEX) for failing to examine the registration statements of
Printron and other Emerging Company Marketplace firms.283 The article
referred to Schuler’s status as a transgender woman and mentioned a lawsuit
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.

Id.
Id. at 773–74.
Id. at 774.
Id.
Id. at 774.
Id.
Id. at 774–75.
Id. at 774.
Id.
Id. at 775.
Schuler v. McGraw-Hill Cos., 989 F. Supp. 1377 (D.N.M. 1997).
Id. at 1382.
Id. at 1383.
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that had been filed against her when she was still a man.284 According to
Schuler, the article implied that she had “changed her sex in order to conceal an
SEC filing rather than to cure her gender dysphoria syndrome.”285 Schuler’s
complaint alleged several torts, three of which were from Prosser’s four
categories: publication of private fact, intrusion, and false light.286 The court
granted Business Week’s motion to dismiss on all counts. Without strongly
siding with Schuler, it bears pointing out that her suit was not without a tinge of
merit.
The Diaz court and the Schuler court reached dramatically different
assessments of the merits of the private fact claims of their respective plaintiffs.
Although both cases involve a private fact claim brought by a transgender
woman, the primary difference between the two cases was the degree of
secrecy the women accorded to their birth sex. Diaz, the woman elected class
president, had not made her transgender status public to the world at large, but
Schuler had. Rejecting Schuler’s publication of private facts claim, the court
appropriately pointed out that in the 1970s she had given interviews to The
Washington Post and People Magazine recounting her sex change, making the
facts a matter of public record.287 It could be argued, however, that those
interviews had lapsed into practical obscurity.288
Schuler’s intrusion claim, which the court rejected, struck the court as pro
forma because all Schuler had done to support it was to restate the same facts
and arguments used to support her weak publication of private facts tort
claim.289 Unsurprisingly, the court held that Schuler failed to state a claim for
intrusion.290
The court held that the references to Schuler’s transsexual status were not
false or defamatory.291 In doing so, it dealt inadequately with whether the
article placed her in a false light. With regard to defamation, the court analyzed
twenty-eight sentences in the Business Week article, some of them pointing to
the plaintiff’s sex change.292 The court concluded that the article raised the
legitimate question of whether the sex change was an advantage for Schuler,
284. Id.
285. Id. at 1384–85.
286. Id. at 1389–90.
287. Id. at 1390.
288. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749,
770 (1989) (that “an event is not wholly ‘private’ does not mean that an individual has no interest
in limiting disclosure or dissemination of the information.”); id. at 780 (“The privacy interest in
maintaining the practical obscurity of rap-sheet information will always be high.”).
289. Schuler, 989 F. Supp. at 1390.
290. Id. Today, calling attention to personal facts about a person is the kind of thing we
might regard in ordinary parlance as intrusive. But to plead the intrusion privacy tort, a plaintiff
must allege and prove facts that go to the elements of the tort. Even when the facts are alleged and
a paradigm instance of intrusion is seemingly proven, as in Plaxico v. Michael, 735 So. 2d 1036,
1038 (Miss. 1999), an LGBT plaintiff may lose.
291. Schuler, 989 F. Supp. at 1390.
292. See id. at 1384–89.
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because AMEX did not realize that a lawsuit filed against the plaintiff under
her male surname (Huminik) was a suit against her. The plaintiff argued that
statements such as the “Schuler/Huminik affair,” “the next Huminik/Schuler
exploit,” and the “Huminik/Schuler matter” suggested that she either had a
multiple personality disorder or was “involved in a game of hide and seek.”293
In response, the court held that these phrases are not false statements of facts
and not defamatory in the context of the article.294 If, however, the Business
Week story could have been fairly read as implying that Schuler changed her
sex to escape recognition as the person the business world knew as Mr.
Huminik, she arguably would have had a plausible false light action. It is one
thing to point out that a sex change can have career advantages but something
else to imply that a sex change was prompted by an unethical and perhaps
pathological desire to gain those advantages.
Finally, Schuler’s intentional infliction of emotional distress claim was
rejected on the ground that there was nothing outrageous in Business Week
magazine’s conduct.295 Furthermore, the court found Schuler’s transsexual
status was relevant to the article—a new sex and a new name meant that some
individuals in the business community did not know that when dealing with
Schuler they were dealing with a person who was already known to them as
Huminik. But there are several questions of fact the court did not give Schuler a
chance to prove to a jury.296 These questions include whether the article
implied that she changed her sex for success in the business world, whether
publishing the implication was outrageous, and whether Schuler experienced
severe emotional distress as a result of the defendant’s outrageous conduct.
Imagine that Schuler produced evidence of a psychiatric diagnosis of gender
dysphoria dating back to adolescence and evidence of years of therapy and
medical treatments, culminating in surgical sex reassignment. A fact finder
might well have concluded that was outrageous for a magazine to suggest
blithely Schuler would have changed her sex merely to advance her career.
D. Problems of Selective Disclosure
In addressing wrongful publication of private fact claims, courts have not
always grappled with the important question of what might be termed LGBT
293. Id. at 1386–87. Schuler’s reference in her argument to “multiple personality disorder”
displayed a regrettable lack of knowledge about this psychiatric condition—a condition it was
unfair to say Business Week attributed to her. People with the rare, controversial condition
dissociative identity disorder (“multiple personality disorder”) typically develop two or more
distinct personalities, often in response to a serious emotional trauma. They do not typically
surgically alter their external appearances in order to satisfy the gender identities of one of their
personalities. See generally David H. Gleaves, Mary C. May & Etzel Cardeña, An Examination of
the Diagnostic Validity of Dissociative Identity Disorder, 21 Clinical Psychol. Rev. 577
(2001).
294. Schuler, 989 F. Supp. at 1386–87.
295. Id. at 1390.
296. See id. at 1391–92.
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“selective disclosure rights.” Is there a right to maintain secrecy with respect to
sexual orientation in some contexts, despite freely disclosing sexual orientation
in other contexts? Should there be a legal right to be “out” for some purposes
and “in” for others? What are the psychological, social, and political
dimensions of LGBT Americans’ need to control the flow of information about
sexual orientation?
These questions are implicit in cases in which courts must decide whether
unwanted disclosure to a small group constitutes “publication.” In Borquez297
and Greenwood v. Taft,298 employment cases, the courts answered the question
in the affirmative. The workplace in each case was a law firm. The court in
Borquez held that the publication private fact claim’s secrecy element could be
satisfied by limited disclosure to a discrete segment of the public, such as
fellow employees in a workplace.299
In Greenwood v. Taft, plaintiff Scott Greenwood argued that the defendant
law firm Taft, Stettinius & Hollister fired him because he was gay.300 The trial
court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant.301 The appellate
court affirmed the rejection of Mr. Greenwood’s wrongful discharge claim
because Ohio offered no defense to LGBT people in its antidiscrimination
law.302 However, the court reversed the dismissal of Greenwood’s publication
of private fact claim.303 Greenwood argued that when he amended his benefits
forms to include his male partner as the recipient of his pension, staff within the
law firm disclosed the information to other people to whom the information
was irrelevant.304 The court concluded that a reasonable person who has
disclosed his sexual orientation for some employment-related purposes might
nonetheless have been offended by being more generally “outed.”305 The court
emphasized that the plaintiff shared the information with people to whom the
information was irrelevant and that the information did not stay within the law
firm, implying that the requirement of public disclosure could potentially be
established at trial.306 However, the court ultimately held that whether the
defendant publicly disclosed the information was a question of fact that needed

297. Borquez v. Ozer, 923 P.2d 166 (Colo. App. 1995), rev’d on other grounds, 940 P.2d
371 (Colo. 1997).
298. Greenwood v. Taft, Stettinius & Hollister, 663 N.E.2d 1030, 1034 (Ohio Ct. App.
1995).
299. Borquez, 923 P.2d at 173. The Supreme Court of Colorado reversed the case, stating
that the trial court erred by instructing the jury that the plaintiff’s claim could be based on
“publicity” of private fact rather than “publication.” 940 P.2d 371 (Colo. 1997).
300. Greenwood, 663 N.E.2d at 1034.
301. Id. at 1031.
302. Id. at 1032.
303. Id. at 1036.
304. Id. at 1034.
305. Id. at 1035.
306. Id. at 1035–36.
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to be examined by the trial court.307
Few cases better highlight the problem of selective disclosure than Sipple
v. Chronicle Publishing,308 a case in which a bid for selective disclosure rights
was rejected on dramatic facts. Oliver W. Sipple, a gay ex-marine, prevented
the assassination of President Gerald Ford by foiling Sara Jane Moore’s attempt
to shoot Mr. Ford.309 Following the incident, Sipple became a hero and
received significant publicity.310 Subsequently, several newspapers published
articles describing Sipple as a gay activist and as a friend of Harvey Milk,311 a
famous gay political figure. Sipple’s heroism and military service history
challenged the once pervasive stereotype of homosexual men as weak and
timid. The public speculated whether the White House’s failure to display
gratitude toward Sipple stemmed from the administration’s bias toward
homosexuals.312
Sipple found press reports of his homosexuality offensive and filed a
complaint for publication of private facts.313 He argued that press reports
exposed his sexual orientation to close relatives, his employer, and other people
who previously did not know about it.314 As a consequence his family
abandoned him, and Sipple suffered embarrassment and mental anguish.315
Mr. Sipple appealed a trial court’s summary judgment order in favor of
the defendants, who consisted of several publishers, a newspaper, and a
columnist.316 The appellate court upheld the dismissal of Sipple’s complaint,
finding that Sipple’s sexual orientation was not a private fact, and the
publication was newsworthy and thus protected by the First Amendment.317
The court stated that Sipple was a known gay figure in San Francisco who had
marched in gay parades and who gay magazines mentioned as a close friend of
Milk.318 Moreover, when asked about his sexual orientation, Sipple himself
admitted that he was gay.319 Therefore, the court concluded that the articles
disclosed a fact that was not private but already publicly known.320 In addition,
the court held that the publication was newsworthy, and did not reveal a fact
that met the requisite level of offensiveness.321

307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.

Id. at 1036.
Sipple v. Chronicle Publ’g Co., 201 Cal. Rptr. 665 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
Id. at 666.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 667.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 668.
Id. at 669.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 669–70.
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While Sipple’s bid for selective disclosure rights met with understandable
failure, the failure of other LGBT plaintiffs’ bids for selective disclosure raises
concern. In Merriwether v. Shorr, substantively a public disclosure case
brought under New York’s commercial appropriation statute,322 a court found
that a picture of a lesbian couple taken at their commitment ceremony and
published years later in a magazine was newsworthy because gay couples’
commitment ceremonies are a reflection of the progress of society.323 Yet the
abatement of stigma and discrimination on a societal level should not mean the
end of individuals’ entitlement to keep their relationships out of the press.
Plaintiffs Valerie Merriwether and Rosetta Fords, a lesbian couple, took
part in a religious commitment ceremony in which one plaintiff was dressed in
a bridal gown and the other a tuxedo, thereby appearing as a traditional bride
and groom.324 Defendant Kathy Shorr was a professional photographer and also
served as their limousine driver on the day of the ceremony.325 In the limousine
she took the plaintiffs’ pictures with their permission.326 She asked for the
plaintiffs’ written consent to use the photographs for commercial purposes, but
the plaintiffs refused.327 Six years later, defendant magazine Popular
Photography published an article on Ms. Shorr’s work, accompanied by a
montage of her pictures, including one of the plaintiffs’ pictures with the
caption: “LESBIAN COUPLE . . . two women on their way to a commitment
ceremony in a church in Greenwich Village.”328 The plaintiffs filed a complaint
claiming invasion of privacy and infliction of emotional distress.329 The
plaintiffs sought monetary and injunctive relief,330 not denying they were gay
but arguing that they always kept their sexual orientation private and discreet.
They also contended that they never disclosed this information to their
coworkers, and that the publication caused them embarrassment and distress.331
The court dismissed the privacy claim against the magazine on the ground
that intimate homosexual ceremonies are a reflection of the progress of society
and are thus newsworthy.332 The court rejected the couple’s emotional distress
claim too. The court stated that the defendants’ conduct did not reach the level

322. The plaintiffs availed themselves of the only privacy right New York embraces, the
right codified in Sections 50 and 51 of the New York Civil Rights Law. N.Y. Civ. Rights Law §
50, 51 (McKinney 1994) (liability for nonconsensual use of a person’s name or likeness for
business or trade purposes).
323. Merriwether v. Shorr, No. 116582/94, 1995 WL 461265 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb 6, 1995).
324. Id. at *1.
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. Id. at *2.
332. Id.
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of outrage required for establishing this tort.333 According to the court, the
picture did not present the plaintiffs in a sensational manner or make the gay
wedding event appear foolish.334 Furthermore, the wedding was held in a public
venue and the festivities took place in several locations.335 In reaching these
conclusions about public and private, the court ignored the potential relevance
of the vast size and effective anonymity of New York City and the couple’s
likely knowledge of how to avoid “running into” workplace colleagues.
The dismissal of the privacy and emotional distress claims ignored the
importance to a gay couple of controlling the flow of information regarding
sexual orientation from limited groups to the broad public.336 The dismissal
entails a rejection of selective disclosure rights, and even more, reflects a policy
of subordinating the personal desire of LGBT individuals for privacy to the
public need for keeping pace with LGBT lifestyles.
Many LGBT Americans have sought to live lives in which their sex,
sexuality, or sexual orientation remains undisclosed in some social networks—
perhaps those including parents or coworkers—but is disclosed in other social
spheres. Yet appellate courts often take what might be called a simplistic “once
out, always out” point of view.337 If tort doctrine currently demands this point
of view, the doctrine and the tort require rethinking and redesign to
accommodate the reasonable privacy preferences of some member of the
LGBT population.
IV
FALSE LIGHT IN THE PUBLIC EYE
The false light tort is among the four recognized in Prosser’s 1960 article
and later incorporated into the Second Restatement of Torts under his
influence.338 The cause of action serves to vindicate interests in both mental
333. Id. at *3.
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. See, e.g., Sipple v. Chronicle Publ’g Co., 201 Cal. Rptr. 665 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984)
(holding that Sipple’s sexual orientation was not a private fact because he was a known gay figure
in San Francisco) cf. Merriwether v. Shorr, No. 116582/94, 1995 WL 461265, at *2 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. Feb. 6, 1995) (“plaintiffs do not deny being lesbians, but contend that they have ‘always been
extremely private and discreet about their long-standing relationship. . . .’ [T]hey never told any of
their co-workers of the nature of their relationship. . .”); Prince v. Out Publ‘g, No. B140475, 2002
WL 7999 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 3, 2002) (rejecting plaintiff’s claim that the article disclosed to a
large number of people that he was gay, information that he had shared previously with only
certain family members and close friends, because the article was newsworthy).
338. Prosser, supra note 10, at 398. The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides:
§ 652E. Publicity Placing Person in False Light
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning another that places the other before the
public in a false light is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if
the false light in which the other was placed would be highly offensive to a reasonable
person, and the actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of
the publicized matter and the false light in which the other would be placed.
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repose and reputation. According to Prosser, the roots of the “false light in the
public eye” tort were deep in the ground before the Warren and Brandeis
article.339 Prosser traced the origins of this tort to an 1816 suit brought by the
poet Lord Byron “enjoining the circulation of a spurious and inferior poem
attributed to his pen.”340 Prosser identified three categories of false light in the
public eye cases: (1) inaccurate attribution cases (like Byron’s); (2) misleading
use of photographs cases; and (3) imputation of criminality cases.341 Prosser
wrote that “[t]he false light cases obviously differ from those of intrusion, or
disclosure of private facts” in that the interest protected is reputation as in
defamation.342 But as previously emphasized, plaintiffs alleging invasion of
privacy after 1960 also commonly allege two or more of Prosser’s torts. The
contemporary false light case—whether involving inaccurate attribution,
misleading photographs, and/or implied immorality or criminality—is also
likely to be an intrusion case, and/or a disclosure of private fact case. For
example, LGBT plaintiffs or plaintiffs claiming not to be LGBT who bring
suits alleging false light commonly also allege intrusion, publication of private
facts, and even appropriation claims. If false light is normatively akin to
defamation, then defamation is normatively akin to the invasion of privacy tort
generally.
A. False Light: Misattribution of Sexual Orientation
In several cases alleging false light, the plaintiffs argued that they were
not gay, lesbian, or transgender but were falsely portrayed as such and sought
recovery. In D.C. v. Harvard-Westlake School, the parents of a high school boy
filed an action against his secondary school. The school allegedly allowed or
assisted students and the school newspaper to depict falsely the youth as gay
and to belittle him as a “faggot.”343 In another case, Langford v. Sessions, a
man’s photograph was used in a flier that promoted a gay club and portrayed
him as gay.344 In Douglass v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., a heterosexual woman
alleged that nude photographs of her posing with another woman published in
Hustler Magazine falsely portrayed her as a lesbian.345 In Geissler v. Petrocelli,
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652E (1977).
339. Prosser, supra note 10, at 398.
340. Id.
341. See id. at 399 nn.140 & 143; Martin v. Johnson Publ’g Co., 157 N.Y.S.2d 409 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1956) (“Man Hungry” woman); Semler v. Ultem Publ’ns, 9 N.Y.S.2d 319 (N.Y. City Ct.
1938).
342. Prosser, supra note 10, at 400.
343. D.C. v. Harvard-Westlake Sch., 98 Cal. Rptr. 3d 300 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (defendant
school’s motion to compel arbitration reversed).
344. Langford v. Sessions, No. 03-255 (CKK) (D.D.C. July 29, 2005),
https://ecf.dcd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/show_public_doc?2003cv0255-17.
345. Douglass v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 769 F.2d 1128, 1135 (7th Cir. 1985) (reversing a
large judgment in favor of plaintiff, reasoning that “Hustler is a magazine for men. Few men are
interested in lesbians. The purpose of showing two women in an apparent sexual embrace is to
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a woman claimed a book authored by former colleague falsely depicted her as
transgender.346 Finally, in Tina Thompson v. John Doe, a female “exotic
dancer” filed a false light claim against a male entertainer known as “Shawty
Shawty” who frequented Pleasers, the Atlanta club at which she worked.347
Shawty Shawty posted on his Twitter account: “Pass this on. There is a nigga
dancing at Pleasures. His name is Nairobi and it looks female. Ass and titties
and pussy! Be careful!”348
The false light tort does not require proof on the part of plaintiffs that a
defendant has published an untruth. It requires that defendant has published
words or images that depict the plaintiff in a false or misleading light. Plaintiffs
need not be prepared to characterize defendants as liars. However, courts
struggle with how to distinguish false light actions from defamation actions.349
Some courts will dismiss false light actions if the plaintiff’s claim is that
attributions of LGBT status are flatly untrue. Thus in Nazeri v. Missouri Valley
College, the court found that a state school system employee condemned by a
college Vice President as incompetent and a “fag” would have to seek recovery
through a defamation claim.350 In Albright v. Morton, a straight man alleged
privacy invasion following publication of a book in which a gay man’s
photograph appeared alongside a caption bearing his name.351 Plaintiffs James
Albright, a former bodyguard and the ex-lover of the pop star Madonna, and his
ex-employer Amrak Productions sued defendants Andrew Morton, Michael
O’Mara Books, St. Martin’s Press, and Newsgroup Newspapers for allegedly
falsely portraying Albright as a homosexual in their book.352 The court held
that Albright’s false light claim was actually a defamation claim because “he
objects to the making of a false statement, not the revelation of private
information.”353 Albright was an especially far-fetched, even silly false light
claim litigated by a straight man.354 However, the Massachusetts court took

display the charms of two women.”); cf. Schomer v. Smidt, 170 Cal. Rptr. 662 (Cal. Ct. App.
1980) (holding that a false attribution of homosexuality is “slander per se” in a case where flight
attendant sued fellow employee for slander, invasion of privacy, battery and intentional infliction
of emotional distress after she falsely represented to others that the plaintiff was a lesbian).
346. Geisler v. Petrocelli, 616 F.2d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 1980).
347. Complaint for Thompson, supra note 53, at 3–4.
348. Id. at 4.
349. Cf. Jews for Jesus, Inc., v. Rapp, 997 So.2d 1098, 1114 (Fla.2008) (declining to
recognize a claim for false light invasion of privacy separate from defamation).
350. Nazeri v. Missouri Valley Coll., 860 S.W.2d 303, 312 (Mo. 1993).
351. Albright v. Morton, 321 F. Supp. 2d 130 (D. Mass. 2004).
352. Id. at 132–33.
353. Id. at 140.
354. See id. at 136. The court also rejected the false light claim because the tort was not
recognized in Massachusetts. Id. at 140. Albright asked the court to recognize the false light claim,
and the court held that it was not essential to recognize the tort for this case. Id. In Massachusetts
there was a cause of action for invasion of privacy, but in this case all the information in the book
was delivered with the permission of Albright, so there was no invasion of privacy. Id. The court
rejected all the other claims. See id. at 133.
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advantage of the case as an opportunity to advance large claims about the
modern significance of stating that a person is a homosexual: it can be
defamatory to assert falsely that someone is homosexual, but it is no longer
inherently highly offensive or defamatory per se to assert that someone is a
homosexual.
The defendants purchased from Albright the rights to publish information
about his romantic relationship with Madonna, and later published it in an
internationally distributed book.355 The book contained a picture of Madonna
walking beside her ex-employee, Jose Guitierez.356 Guitierez was outspoken
about his sexual orientation and represented “his homosexual ideology in what
many would refer to as sometimes graphic and offensive detail.”357 According
to the complaint, Guitierez was well known because he appeared in a
documentary about Madonna, and performed on stage with her.358 The caption
accompanying the picture of Guitierez read “Jim Albright (with Madonna in
1993) told Morton he felt ‘overwhelming love’ for her.”359 Albright in turn
argued that the picture portrayed him as gay.360
The plaintiffs filed a complaint for defamation, among other claims, but
the court held that the photograph contained nothing to imply that Albright was
gay.361 Furthermore, the book described Albright as having had a long
heterosexual relationship with Madonna.362 The court also stated that, even if
the picture implied that Albright was gay, to identify someone as gay is not a
defamatory act per se and such a holding would “legitimize relegating
homosexuals to second-class status.”363 The court discussed several
developments in law, including the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s
decision in favor of same-sex marriage, as indicating that the law cannot
support a discriminatory view of gays.
B. Misattribution of Lifestyle or Character
Sometimes LGBT individuals resort to the privacy tort, not to complain
that someone has revealed their sexual orientation, but that someone has
distorted or degraded their characters in way connected to their sexual
orientation. Andrea Dworkin’s false light claim against Hustler Magazine can
be understood in this light.364 In another case, a former employee sued Sun
Microsystems alleging that his supervisor depicted him in a false light by
355.
356.
357.
358.
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.
364.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 133–34.
Id. at 133.
Id. at 134.
Id. at 136.
Id. at 136.
Id. at 138.
Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine Inc., 867 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1989).
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telling others he had “hit on” coworkers, turning him into a perpetrator of
sexual harassment.365 The Schuler v. McGraw-Hill Cos.366 court, as discussed
earlier, rejected the false light claim of a transgender businesswoman who
argued that the article implied she “changed her sex in order to conceal an SEC
filing rather than to cure her gender dysphoria syndrome.”367 The court held
that the article “raise[d] the legitimate issue of whether Plaintiff’s sex change
worked to her advantage by concealing part of her past.”368 The court stated
that a false light claim required proof of a false statement of fact, which in this
case the plaintiff did not establish.369 Schuler also did not prove that the article
placed her under false light.370
In Whitaker v. A&E Television Networks, defendant-appellant A&E
Television Networks broadcasted a picture of the plaintiff in its documentary,
“The History of Sex,” that suggested the plaintiff was gay, HIV-positive, and a
drug user.371 According to the court,
The narrator state[d]: “AIDS had exacted a deadly toll on gay men
and [intravenous] drug users as well as hundreds of thousands of
heterosexuals in Africa and Haiti. But it wasn’t publicly
acknowledged by [President] Ronald Reagan until well after Rock
Hudson died of the disease in 1985. . . .” Just before the narrator
[stated] “users,” the documentary shows a picture of [plaintiffrespondent Miles] Whitaker on the street at night shaking what
appears to be a cup and nodding at people walking by.372
The documentary neither mentioned Whitaker’s name, nor mentioned he
was HIV-positive, a drug user, or homosexual.373 Nonetheless the plaintiff
argued that the documentary inaccurately portrayed him as a gay drug user
living with HIV.374 The plaintiff filed a complaint for defamation, false light,
and intentional infliction of emotional distress, and he sought injunctive
relief.375 The defendant moved to strike, arguing the causes of action arose
from First Amendment-protected activity.376 The trial court denied the motion,
and the defendant appealed.
Affirming the trial court’s decision, the appellate court held that, while the
365. Willliams v. Sun Microsystems, Inc., No. H029828, 2007 WL 2254301 (Cal. Ct. App.
Aug 7, 2007) (false light claim time dismissed as barred by statute of limitations).
366. Schuler v. McGraw-Hill Cos., 989 F. Supp. 1377 (D.N.M. 1997).
367. Id. at 1384–85.
368. Id. at 1385.
369. Id. at 1390.
370. Id.
371. Whitaker v. A&E Television Networks, No. G040880, 2009 WL 1383617, at *1 (Cal.
Ct. App. May 18, 2009).
372. Id. at *1.
373. Id.
374. Id.
375. Id.
376. Id.
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subject matter of the documentary was a matter of public concern, the plaintiff
was not a public figure, and whether he was a drug user or HIV carrier was not
a matter of public concern.377 The defendants argued that the documentary did
not disclose the plaintiff’s name and his appearance was brief.378 The court
rejected this argument, stating that the relevant question was whether the
documentary implied that the plaintiff belonged to one of the groups
mentioned: gays, drug users, or HIV carriers.379
C. False Light and Beyond: Privacy Invasions Excused for the Greater Good
Individuals who have sued under any privacy tort theory alleging that
their actions, opinions, or beliefs were portrayed in a false and misleading light
have often lost these suits.380 In Dominick v. Index Journal Co.,381 the
defendant newspaper, The Index Journal, published a pro-gay letter and
attributed it to the plaintiff. The plaintiff denied writing it. The letter preached
tolerance toward same-sex marriage, arguing against the “‘close-minded
opinions’ of a lot of local citizens . . . towards the gay and lesbian celebrations”
in the area, and calling for the “need to expand our horizons on prejudice.”382
The plaintiff was gay and argued that the article exposed his “private affairs,”
although it was not clear if he argued that his homosexual identity was exposed
or just his view on gay marriage.383 Among the privacy torts, a false light claim
would have been better suited to the facts, but the tort is not favored in South
Carolina and may not be available at all.384 Dominick filed a complaint for
negligence, libel, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional
377. Id. at *3.
378. Id. at *4.
379. Id.
380. In the Uranga case, the plaintiff had to abandon his false light claim because the
publication that placed him in false light relied on a court record, and the court held that it would
be an unreasonable burden on newspapers to verify every court document. Uranga v. Federated
Publ’ns, Inc., 67 P.3d 29 (Idaho 2003). In Prince, the court rejected a gay model’s claim that he
was falsely portrayed as attending a type of party popular with a segment of the gay community
because the party was a public event. Prince v. Out Publ’g, No. B140475, 2002 WL 7999 (Cal. Ct.
App. Jan. 3, 2002). Furthermore, in Raymen v. United Senior Ass’n, Inc., a picture of same-sex
spouses kissing was published without their permission as part of an advertising campaign to
which they objected. 409 F. Supp. 2d 15, 18–19 (D.D.C. 2006). The newspaper photographer had
photographed the couple while they waited their turn to marry. Id. at 18. The men unsuccessfully
argued that the publication falsely portrayed them as “unpatriotic American citizens who do not
support the United States Military.” Id. at 22. Neither their false light nor their appropriation
claims were sustained. Id. at 18.
381. Dominick v. Index Journal Co., No. 99-CP-24-370, 2001 WL 1763977 (S.C. Ct. Com.
Pl. Mar. 15, 2001).
382. Id. at *1.
383. Id. at *3.
384. See Gignilliat v. Gignilliat, Savitz & Bettis, L.L.P., 684 S.E.2d 756, 759 (S.C. 2009)
(“In South Carolina, there are three separate and distinct causes of action for invasion of privacy:
1) wrongful appropriation of personality; 2) wrongful publicizing of private affairs; and 3)
wrongful intrusion into private affairs.” (citing Swinton Creek Nursery v. Edisto Farm Credit, 514
S.E.2d 126 (1999))).
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distress.385 The trial court granted the media defendant’s motion for summary
judgment as to all counts except negligence.
On appeal, the court held that Dominick failed to establish a libel claim
because the publication did not adversely affect the plaintiff or his reputation in
the community.386 The court also denied the publication of private fact claim
because the plaintiff did not establish that the defendant intentionally gave
publicity to private fact or had knowledge that adverse results were likely to
follow.387 As to the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, the court
determined that the plaintiff could not establish that the defendant’s “conduct
was so extreme or outrageous that [it] exceeded all possible bounds of
decency.”388 Finally, the court dismissed the negligence cause of action because
the plaintiff’s libel claim had been denied, and the court did not want the
plaintiff to use the negligence claim to “sneak[] into the courthouse through the
back door.”389 Since the libel claim provides some constitutional protections
that do not exist in negligence, the court expressed concern that allowing the
plaintiff to plead negligence would undermine the media’s First Amendment
protection and defeat the purposes of libel law.390
Of special interest, the court seemed unwilling to punish the media for
publishing a letter discussing a matter of public interest. The court observed
that the “letter discussed two major public events, one of which occurred in
South Carolina and was the subject of two news articles in the Index Journal
the month preceding the publication of the letter.”391 Moreover the “letter
called for community tolerance and promoted constitutional values.”392
In Dominick, as in other cases, the national importance of the LGBT
population’s historic quest for equality and inclusion undercuts the practical
utility of the invasion of privacy tort and perhaps the defamation tort as well.
Recall the Massachusetts judge in Albright arguing that the lessening of stigma
and discrimination in his state, which recognized same-sex marriage in 2003 in
Goodridge, means it can no longer be considered defamatory to gossip that
someone is a homosexual.393 In the words of another judge: “Several legal
authorities have suggested that one’s identity as a homosexual—even though it
385. Dominick, 2001 WL 1763977, at *1.
386. Id. at *2–*3.
387. Id. at *4.
388. Id.
389. Id. at *5.
390. Id.
391. Id. at *4.
392. Id.
393. Albright v. Morton, 321 F. Supp. 2d 130, 136 (D. Mass. 2004) (“I could not find that
such a statement is capable of a defamatory meaning. . . . [I]n this day and age, I cannot conclude
that identifying someone as a homosexual discredits him, that the statement fits within the
category of defamation per se.”). The Albright court argued that in the wake of Lawrence v. Texas
accusations of homosexuality no longer imply criminality and that describing someone as a
homosexual is no longer properly viewed as defamatory per se. Id. at 137.

allenCLRfinalNoPagination.doc (Do Not Delete)

20xx]

UNRELIABLE REMEDIES FOR LGBT PLAINTIFFS

12/1/2010 4:33 PM

145

is in essence a private matter—is inherently a matter of public concern because
it ‘necessarily and ineluctably’ involves that person in the ongoing public
debate regarding the rights of homosexuals.”394 In Prince, the gay model lost
on his privacy claims against Out magazine because photographs of him
selected for the magazine had been taken in a “public place” and illustrated a
newsworthy public health story.395 It did not seem to matter to the court that the
model whose photographs Out had appropriated had not yet come out to his
family and did not live the reckless life of excessive illegal drug use and
unprotected sex described in the article.396 Although information about sexual
orientation can be highly sensitive, courts have deemed the conduct and
experiences of members of the LGBT population broadly “public,”
“newsworthy,” and “of legitimate public concern” even when individual
members of the group have not.397
V
APPROPRIATION
A plaintiff’s prima face case of appropriation will typically allege a
nonconsensual use of the name, moniker, or photographic likeness of the
plaintiff in an advertisement or in connection with a business or commercial
product such as a book, magazine, newspaper, or film. The first state court to
recognize the existence of a freestanding invasion of privacy cause of action
did so in the context of an “appropriation” case.398
Prosser identified “appropriation” as among the four extant privacy torts
and included it in his formulation of the tort for the Second Restatement.399
Prosser did not think commercially appropriating attributes of personal identity,
intrusion upon seclusion, or false light were the kind of offenses Warren and
Brandeis had in mind for their new tort action to address, and he seems to have
been correct.400 But common law courts citing Warren and Brandeis
nonetheless came to regard these offenses, along with publication of private

394. Weaver v. Nebo Sch. Dist., 29 F. Supp.2d 1279, 1284 (D. Utah 1998) (citing Rowland
v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 470 U.S. 1009, 1012 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari)). The court went on to conclude: “Thus, it could be said that a voluntary ‘coming out’
or an involuntary ‘outing’ of a gay, lesbian or bisexual teacher would always be a matter of public
concern.” Id.
395. Prince v. Out Publ’g, No. B140475, 2002 WL 7999, at *9. (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 3,
2002).
396. Id. at *7–*8.
397. I refer to Sipple, Uranga, Prince, Cinel and other individuals extensively discussed
herein.
398. Pavesich v New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 68 (Ga. 1905).
399. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652C (1977) (“One who
appropriates to his own use or benefit the name or likeness of another is subject to liability to the
other for invasion of his privacy.”).
400. See Prosser, supra note 10, at 401.
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fact, as actionable “invasions of privacy.”401 Upon reflection, it should not be
surprising that courts would regard using a person’s name, picture, or likeness
in circulated materials as a wrong in the same general category of tort as prying
into that same person’s private life or publishing the details of her private life.
Commercial appropriation and publication of private fact are both ways of
paying attention and calling attention to someone who might prefer to be let
alone.
A. Appropriation Tort Winners
Appropriation claims by those portrayed as homosexual are occasionally
successful, as in Langford v. Sessions.402 Plaintiff Marcus Langford was an
amateur bodybuilder who alleged that the defendants, a nightclub and flierdesign company, impermissibly used his photograph on a flier to promote a gay
party.403 The flier was also posted on a website.404 Langford argued that the
flier wrongfully portrayed him as gay, and as a result, he allegedly suffered
emotional damage. Based on his religious background and beliefs, a gay
lifestyle was intolerable.405 He argued that since the publication, more gays
approached him in the gym, and he had to explain to friends that he was not
gay.406 He also contended that after the flier was distributed, the website
Gay.com started using his photograph as a profile picture.407 In addition to
punitive damages, Langford filed a complaint for misappropriation, false light,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence, and defamation.408 The
court found Langford entitled to compensatory damages for counts of
misappropriation, false light, and negligence and awarded him $70,000.409
The court found that the defendants appropriated Langford’s photograph
for their benefit.410 This holding is consistent with Prosser’s description of the
appropriation tort as effective for plaintiffs who show that a defendant has
pirated the plaintiff’s identity for some advantage of his own.411 The Langford
court also held that the use of the photograph placed the plaintiff in false light
because it portrayed him as something he was not, and he had a right to portray

401. See, e.g., Pavesich, 50 S.E. at 74 (citing Warren and Brandeis).
402. See Langford v. Sessions, No. 03-255 (CKK) (D.D.C. July 29, 2005),
https://ecf.dcd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/show_public_doc?2003cv0255-17. But see Douglass v.
Hustler Magazine, Inc., 769 F.2d 1128, 1135 (7th Cir. 1985); Raymen v. United Senior Ass’n,
Inc., 409 F. Supp. 2d 15 (D.D.C. 2006).
403. Langford, No. 03-255 (CKK), at 1.
404. Id. at 1.
405. Id. at 4–6.
406. Id. at 5.
407. Id. at 4.
408. Id. at 1.
409. Id. at 15.
410. Id. at 10.
411. Prosser, supra note 10, at 403.
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himself in that context in a manner of his choosing.412 The court thus found the
defendant liable for negligence because reasonable care would have included
asking for the plaintiff’s permission to use his photograph.413
The court rejected Langford’s intentional infliction of emotional distress
claim because he had not shown he asked the defendants to stop using the
photograph.414 In addition, the defendants’ conduct was not so extreme and the
plaintiff did not prove he suffered emotional damage “so acute a nature that
harmful physical consequences might be not unlikely to result.”415 The court
also dismissed the claim for punitive damages, finding that the defendants’
conduct was not outrageous and that they did not act in malice, did not risk
harm to others, did not physically or economically harm the plaintiff, and did
not repeat the tortious act.416 Rejecting the claim for defamation, the court held
that the plaintiff did not prove that claiming someone is homosexual is a
defamatory act.417
Albright v. Morton, cited by the Langford court to support the notion that
“an allegation of homosexuality is defamatory does not have an initial
plausibility or appeal,”418 rejected an appropriation claim brought by
Madonna’s ex-bodyguard and lover.419 In Albright the court stated that for
plaintiffs to prevail in an appropriation case, they need to prove that the
appropriation’s purpose is to take advantage of their reputation or prestige.420
The court held that, even though the defendant used Albright’s picture to sell
more books, since the picture was also published in a newspaper article, it did
not use the reputation of Albright or make commercial use of Albright’s
name.421
B. Appropriation Losers
As in Albright, appropriation claims by those wrongly portrayed as
homosexual are sometimes unsuccessful. Raymen v. United Senior Ass’n, Inc.,
is another, less palatable, example.422 In Raymen, a newspaper photographer
shot a picture of the plaintiffs, a same-sex couple, kissing while waiting their
turn to marry.423 The photograph was published in the newspaper and on its
412. Langford, No. 03-255 (CKK), at 10.
413. Id. at 11–12.
414. Id. at 10–11.
415. Id. at 11 (citing Kitt v. Capital Concerts, Inc., 742 A.2d 856, 862 (D.C. 1999)).
416. Id. at 14.
417. Id. at 13.
418. Id. at 13 n.6 (citing Albright v. Morton, 321 F. Supp. 2d 130, 139 (D. Mass. 2004)).
419. Albright, 321 F. Supp. 2d 130 at 139 (D. Mass. 2004).
420. Id. at 139–40.
421. Id.
422. 409 F. Supp. 2d 15, 18–19 (D.D.C. 2006). In Albright the alleged appropriation was in
a detergent publication glitch, whereas in Raymen the use of the plaintiffs’ photographs was
intentional and for political gain unrelated to the beliefs and values of the plaintiffs. Id. at 18.
423. Id.
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website and later used without permission as part of an advertisement for a
nonprofit organization, United Senior Association (USA Next).424 USA Next
challenged the positions taken by the American Association of Retired Persons
(AARP).425 The advertisement contained two pictures: one of the plaintiffs
kissing with a green checkmark over it and a second picture of an American
soldier, presumably in Iraq, with a red X over it.426 Under the photograph there
was a caption: “The Real AARP Agenda,” suggesting that AARP opposes the
United States’ wars abroad and supports gay lifestyle.427 The plaintiffs argued
that the advertisement portrayed them as against American troops and
unpatriotic.428 They allegedly suffered embarrassment and extreme emotional
distress in consequence and filed a complaint for libel, false light, appropriation
of their likeness, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.429
The court rejected the men’s appropriation claim, stating that the
advertisement was non-commercial.430 The photograph had been used by a
nonprofit organization and was not for commercial use.431 The court then
characterized the publication as newsworthy and thus protected by the First
Amendment.432 The court held that the campaign used the photograph to
address matters of legitimate public concern—same-sex marriage and support
for the military.433 The court also dismissed libel, false light, and intentional
infliction of emotional distress claims.434
In Prince, the court held that the misappropriation claim was not
actionable because the photograph accompanied an article on a gay lifestyle
that was an “element of popular culture,” and thus newsworthy.435 The
contention that a matter is newsworthy merely because it relates to the
amorphous beast “popular culture” threatens to gut the right to privacy entirely.
VI

424. Id.
425. Id. at 19.
426. Id.
427. Id.
428. Id.
429. Id. at 19–20.
430. Id. at 20.
431. Id.
432. Id. at 23.
433. Id. at 25.
434. The court dismissed all claims, holding that the plaintiffs failed to establish libel
because the advertisement was not defamatory and a reasonable person could not interpret the
advertisement as stating that the plaintiffs were unpatriotic. Id. at 21–22. The court similarly
dismissed the couple’s false light claim on the ground that there was no reasonable link between
the advertisement and the pictured men’s belief system. Id. at 25. The kissers’ intentional
infliction of emotional distress claim was denied because the defendant’s conduct was not so
outrageous in character as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency. Id. at 29–30.
435. Prince v. Out Publ’g, No. B140475, 2002 WL 7999, at *10. (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 3,
2002).

allenCLRfinalNoPagination.doc (Do Not Delete)

20xx]

UNRELIABLE REMEDIES FOR LGBT PLAINTIFFS

12/1/2010 4:33 PM

149

INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
Prosser was skeptical of the privacy tort. He feared the tort—the four
torts—would be overly generous to plaintiffs with trivial or self-inflicted
wounds.436 He also feared the tort would be duplicative of other actions with
the same gist: “Taking intrusion [e.g.], the gist of the wrong is clearly the
intentional infliction of mental distress, which is now in itself a recognized
basis of tort liability.”437 He could not have known that fifty years later lawyers
would survey the privacy tort case law and find duplication (1) among the four
privacy torts; and (2) between the privacy torts and defamation, and the privacy
torts and intentional infliction of emotional distress, and—not examined here—
between the privacy torts and the right to publicity438 and confidentiality.439
The privacy torts have been additive and duplicative, but not in ways that
appear to have made a difference in the justice of outcomes.
There may be duplication and even cannibalization, but LGBT cases
suggest that the invasion of privacy tort and the infliction of emotional distress
torts function more as friends than competitors. The intentional infliction of
emotional distress tort commonly accompanies the invasion of privacy torts in
lawsuits alleging wrongs of intrusion, publicity, and appropriation, with the
latter two more or less standing or falling together. In Simpson, for example,
the court held that the sending of threatening and intimidating letters to a
lesbian couple invaded privacy and caused extreme emotional distress, driving
them to sell their newly acquired restaurant business and leave town.440 The
repetition of the letters and the death threats supported the emotional distress
claim.441 Meanwhile, the act of publicizing the plaintiff’s sexual orientation in
disparaging letters mailed to the community supported a privacy invasion
claim.442 The court acknowledged that the defendants had the right to believe
that homosexuality “is at odds with the teachings of the bible,” but it found that
the defendants’ behavior “constituted an extraordinary transgression of the
bounds of socially tolerable conduct” and enjoyed no immunity.443
However, in many other cases, the plaintiffs’ emotional distress did not
make the grade.444 Courts in these cases have ruled that wrongdoings did not
436. Prosser, supra note 10, at 422.
437. Id.
438. Cf. Stewart v. Rolling Stone LLC, 105 Cal. Rptr. 3d 98, 111 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010)
(“California has long recognized a common law right of privacy for protection of a person’s name
and likeness against appropriation by others for their advantage.”).
439. See generally Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Privacy’s Other Path: Recovering
the Law of Confidentiality, 96 Geo. L.J. 123 (2007).
440. Simpson v. Burrows, 90 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1131 (D. Or. 2000).
441. Id. at 1124.
442. Id. at 1125.
443. Id. at 1123–24.
444. Courts ruling this way include Raymen v. United Senior Ass’n, Inc., 409 F. Supp. 2d
15 (D.D.C. 2006); Langford v. Sessions, No. 03-255 (CKK) (D.D.C. July 29, 2005),
https://ecf.dcd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/show_public_doc?2003cv0255-17; Albright v. Morton, 321 F.
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amount to extreme and outrageous conduct, which is either intentional or
reckless and which causes the plaintiff severe emotional distress.
Templeton is a good illustration of privacy and emotional distress claims
meeting the same doomed fate.445 Plaintiff Doe and a friend permitted the
defendant Templeton, a professional skateboarder, to take their photograph,
after he had misrepresented himself as world-renowned professional
skateboarder Tony Hawk.446 Defendant Toy Machine used the photograph to
advertise a videotape describing the company’s skateboard team.447 The
advertisement, with the plaintiff’s picture, instructed those who wanted the
videotape to “[w]rite to: I am gay in a happy way not a sexual one” at a specific
address.448 Doe, who was gay, argued that the advertisement drew attention to
and disclosed her sexual identity.449 She filed a complaint for violation of the
Illinois Right of Publicity Act, publication of private facts, intentional infliction
of emotional distress, and negligence.450 The plaintiff, who worked as a
teacher, had to discuss the advertisement with her employer, but did not expose
her sexual orientation during the conversation.451
The court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the
counts of publication of private facts and intentional infliction of emotional
distress. As to the publication of private facts count, the court held that the
plaintiff did not establish the necessary elements of the tort because the
advertisement did not disclose that she was gay but at most “disclosed what
plaintiff looked like on that particular day in June 2002,” and the defendants
did not know that plaintiff was gay and therefore could not intentionally reveal
any private fact.452 In so holding, the court stated for the record that a plaintiff’s
sexual orientation is not a legitimate public concern, and its disclosure could be
highly offensive to a reasonable person in an appropriate case.453
For similar reasons, the court also denied the intentional infliction of
emotional distress claim. For one, the defendants’ behavior was not extreme or
outrageous.454 Second, they did not intend to cause emotional distress to the
plaintiff, as they did not know about the plaintiff’s sexual identity.455 Third, the
Supp. 2d 130 (D. Mass. 2004); Doe v. Templeton, No. 03 C 5076, 2004 WL 1882436 (N.D. Ill.
Aug. 6, 2004); Uranga v. Federated Publications, Inc., 67 P.3d 29, 31 (Idaho 2003); Madsen v.
Erwin, 481 N.E.2d 1160 (Mass. 1985); Merriwether v. Shorr, No. 116582/94, 1995 WL 461265
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb 6, 1995); and Dominick v. Index Journal Co., No. 99-CP-24-370, 2001 WL
1763977 (S.C. Ct. Com. Pl. Mar. 15, 2001).
445. Templeton, 2004 WL 1882436.
446. Id. at *1.
447. Id.
448. Id.
449. Id.
450. Id.
451. Id.
452. Id. at *3.
453. Id.
454. Id. at *5.
455. Id.
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plaintiff failed to introduce compelling evidence to demonstrate severe
emotional distress. Her claims of stress, weight loss, and eczema were
insufficient.456 The claim for punitive damages was denied because the plaintiff
did not establish that the defendants’ conduct was “similar to that found in a
crime.”457 Jane Doe’s privacy and emotional distress actions thus stood and fell
together.
CONCLUSION
Although there have been victories worth mention, the invasion of privacy
tort has not proven especially useful to lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender
plaintiffs. Despite the apparent limited success by LGBT plaintiffs in the cases
examined here, one must acknowledge the theoretical possibility that the
invasion of privacy tort has been a powerful deterrent to privacy invasions
targeting the LGBT population. It is also possible that many invasion of
privacy suits have been filed and either successfully settled out of court or
litigated and won without appeal. Nonetheless, published appellate court
opinions paint a troubling picture, suggesting that privacy tort litigation may
not be worth the bother.
American society seems to be moving toward a more socially tolerant
future. One day, sexual orientation and sex change will cease to warrant special
notice. People will stop threatening, mocking, and discriminating. Although we
are not there yet, some courts have prematurely declared that LGBT persons
have achieved sufficient equality—that what is whispered in the closets can
now be shouted from the rooftops.458 That to be known as queers or fags or
simply as LGBT is no longer to be vulnerable or despised. Courts deciding
whether a privacy claim should withstand summary judgment, a motion to
dismiss, or an appeal should be cautious in adopting what may be overly
expansive, optimistic assumptions about what is appropriately privileged,
public, and newsworthy. I make this point not to cling to the false security of
the closet on behalf of LGBT Americans or to encourage hypersensitivity about
their orientation, identity and relationships, but firmly to decline the invitation
to assume an inherent lack of merit or wisdom in privacy-seeking in everyday
life after Lawrence and Goodridge.
The enduring legacy of Prosser’s article is beyond dispute. However,
several questions must be asked. First, did Prosser acknowledge all of the
categories and subcategories of “privacy” torts?459 The LGBT cases suggest
456. Id.
457. Id.
458. See Luke 12:3 (King James) (“Therefore whatsoever ye have spoken in darkness shall
be heard in the light; and that which ye have spoken in the ear in closets shall be proclaimed upon
the housetops.”); cf. Matthew 10:27 (King James) (“What I tell you in darkness, that speak ye in
light: and what ye hear in the ear, that preach ye upon the housetops.”).
459. Some critics have suggested that Prosser failed to include a fifth privacy tort, “breach
of confidentiality.” See, e.g., Richards & Solove, supra note 439, at 125.
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that Prosser missed or oversimplified cases or categories that ought to have
been included in his purportedly comprehensive analysis of privacy case law.
Second, did Prosser exaggerate the distinctiveness with which his four torts
were imminent in the case law? Edward Bloustein famously argued that the
four privacy torts have an important commonality: the concept of dignity.460 In
fairness, Prosser neither affirms nor denies that there is a common value that
justifies recognition of all four invasions of privacy torts. Yet stressing, as he
did, the severability of the tort into four discrete categories can obscure the
unifying fact that defendants have affronted plaintiffs in a way that leaves
plaintiffs feeling—to borrow an image from the Georgia opinion Pavesich v.
New England Life Insurance—like slaves to a merciless master.461
The cases examined reveal that a gap has developed between the
formalities of pleading that can be credited to Prosser’s enormous influence,
and the actual experiences of LGBT plaintiffs. LGBT plaintiffs often allege in
their complaints that a single injurious episode has given rise to multiple
privacy causes of action. Indeed, LGBT plaintiffs often allege, as a formal
matter, that defendants in a single action violated two, three, or all four of
Prosser’s privacy sub-torts, plus the defamation and emotional distress torts.462
This allegation of multiple torts is an undisputable fact about pleading, a
function of responsible lawyering within the taxonomic framework of the
positive law Prosser shaped. But as Prosser’s critics note, the four torts have in
common a singular normative foundation of respect for human dignity and
inviolate personhood.463 Thus, while LGBT plaintiffs typically allege that a
single wrongful encounter with disrespectful defendants has affronted their
basic desire to be left alone, their attorneys formally divide these encounters
into multiple causes of action. People want to be let alone; leave it to lawyers
and analytic philosophers to tell them they want to be let alone in four or more
distinguishable senses.
In principle, LGBT individuals, like everyone else, can recover for highly
offensive wrongful acts of intrusion, publication, or appropriation. But on the
460. Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean
Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 962, 971 (1964).
461. Pavesich v New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 80 (Ga. 1905) (“[H]e is in reality a
slave without hope of freedom, held to service by a merciless master . . . .”).
462. See, e.g., Schuler v. McGraw-Hill Cos., 989 F. Supp. 1377 (D.N.M. 1997)
(transgender woman alleged that publication of a magazine article critical of her constituted
defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, false light, publication of private facts and
intrusion); Prince v. Out Publ’g, No. B140475, 2002 WL 7999 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 3, 2002) (gay
man alleged that publication of his photographs without consent constituted both libel and
invasion of all four privacy torts); Sipple v. Chronicle Publ’g Co., 201 Cal. Rptr. 665 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1984) (gay ex-marine whose sexual orientation was publicized in the press after he thwarted
assassination of President Ford alleged intrusion, publication of private facts, false light, and
intentional infliction of emotional distress); Madsen v. Erwin, 481 N.E.2d 1160 (Mass. 1985)
(lesbian fired from job at Christian Science Monitor alleged defamation, intrusion, publication of
private facts, and intentional infliction of emotional distress).
463. See generally Bloustein, supra note 460.
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evidence of the tort cases cited in this Article, I reluctantly conclude that
recovery for invasion of privacy is unlikely where the “reasonable person” and
the “reasonable LGBT” person part ways. What is offensive to LGBT persons
struggling for liberty, equality, dignity, and intimacy is not always offensive to
the judiciary’s hypothetical everyman. Homosexuality, gender unorthodoxy,
and sex change were once considered morally illicit, dangerous, and potentially
criminal. Secrecy and selective self-disclosure are needs that arose in a time of
intolerance and discrimination. As long as intolerance and discrimination
against LGBT individuals remain, the need for seclusion, secrecy, and selective
self-disclosure will remain as well.464

464. Sadly, the intimate lives of LGBT Americans are still subject to unwarranted invasion.
On September 22, 2010, Rutgers University freshman Tyler Clementi committed suicide after his
roommate and another student used hidden webcams to stream over the internet live images of
Clementi having sex with a male partner in a supposedly private dorm room.

